

# **No peace, no war in Nagorno-Karabakh**

*Cohesion between ideas of conflict resolution for settling the territorial conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh*

By: Cate van Kessel (5808073)

Bachelor Thesis Interdisciplinary Social Sciences, University of Amsterdam

Specialisation Conflict Studies

First Reader: Anne de Jong, Second Reader: Charlotte Hille

Word count: 19784, Date: June 21, 2013

catevankessel@hotmail.com

## Table of content

Abstract English	iv
Abstract Dutch	iv
Map of Nagorno-Karabakh	v
List of abbreviations and list of tables	v
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>vi</b>
<u>Definition of research problem</u>	vii
<u>Research questions</u>	vii
<u>Relevance</u>	ix
<u>Interdisciplinarity</u>	ix
<b>1. Theory and background</b>	<b>1</b>
<u>1.1 Theory</u>	1
1.1.1 <i>Track One Diplomacy</i>	1
1.1.2 <i>The United Nations</i>	2
1.1.3 <i>The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</i>	4
<u>1.2 Background of Nagorno-Karabakh</u>	5
1.2.1 <i>Historical Background</i>	5
1.2.2 <i>Recent developments in the Nagorno-Karabakh struggle</i>	7
1.2.3 <i>Role of Track One Diplomacy and local ideas</i>	8
<b>2. Methodology</b>	<b>10</b>
<u>2.1. Data-collection</u>	10
2.1.1 <i>Qualitative content analysis</i>	10
2.1.2 <i>Quantitative secondary data-analysis</i>	11
2.1.3 <i>Qualitative in-depth interviews</i>	12
<u>2.2 Data-analysis</u>	12
2.2.1 <i>Qualitative content analysis</i>	12
2.2.2 <i>Quantitative secondary data-analysis</i>	14
2.2.3 <i>Qualitative in-depth interviews</i>	14
<u>2.3 Ethical considerations</u>	15
<b>3. Results</b>	<b>17</b>
<u>3.1 Qualitative content analysis</u>	17
3.1.1 <i>Thematic analysis OSCE documents</i>	17
3.1.2 <i>Thematic analysis UN documents</i>	20
3.1.3 <i>Résumé</i>	23
<u>3.2 Quantitative secondary data-analysis</u>	24
3.2.1 <i>Statistical tests</i>	24
3.2.1.1 <i>Descriptive statistics</i>	24
3.2.1.2 <i>Explanatory statistics</i>	26
3.2.2 <i>Résumé</i>	28
<u>3.3 Qualitative in-depth interviews</u>	29
3.3.1 <i>Thematic analysis of interviews</i>	29
3.3.2 <i>Résumé</i>	34

<b>4. Conclusion</b>	<b>36</b>
<u>4.1 Conclusions</u>	36
<u>4.2 Discussions</u>	38
<i>4.2.1 Reflection</i>	38
<i>4.2.2 Discussion and future research</i>	39
<b>Bibliography</b>	41
<b>Appendixes</b>	<b>46</b>
<u>1. Question content Caucasus Barometer 2011</u>	46
<u>2. Official documents</u>	48
<u>3. Question content Armenian Ambassador</u>	50
<u>4. Question content Armenians</u>	51

## **Abstract English**

This research is about ideas of conflict resolution for settling the territorial conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Within (official) Track One Diplomacy actors have to deal with principles and regulations of international law and politics while resolving a conflict. Limited academic attention has been given to whether the proposed resolutions for Nagorno-Karabakh are cohesive with the local ideas on the ground. As the engagement of citizens is important in conflict resolution, the purpose of this research is to describe and clarify the cohesion between the ideas of resolution of Armenians and the ideas of resolution that have been proposed by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN) as part of Track One Diplomacy.

After carefully investigating academic literature on the topic, three different methods are used to explore and compare the views of resolutions; a qualitative content analysis of official documents of the OSCE and UN is compared with a quantitative data-analysis of structured interviews and a qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews with Armenians.

The proposals of the OSCE and UN for resolving the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh differ in certain ways with the ideas of Armenians. However the views of Armenians about a resolution for settling the territorial conflict are in more ways comparable with the ideas that have been proposed within the Track One Diplomacy of the UN and OSCE. Therefore a strong cohesion exists between the thoughts of conflict resolution, even though these do not correspond completely. The most important mutual ideas is that the conflict should be resolved in a peaceful manner by peaceful negotiations, preferable mediated by the Minsk-Group of the OSCE.

## **Abstract Dutch/ Nederlandse samenvatting**

Dit onderzoek gaat over ideeën van conflictoplossingen voor het territoriale conflict in Nagorno-Karabach. Tijdens het beslechten van een conflict moeten actoren binnen de (officiële) Track One Diplomatie zich confirmeren aan de principes en regels van internationaal recht en politiek. Er is beperkte academische aandacht besteed aan het feit of de voorgestelde oplossingen voor het conflict in Nagorno-Karabach wel samenhangen met de lokale ideeën. Aangezien de betrokkenheid van burgers belangrijk is bij het oplossen van conflicten, is het doel van dit onderzoek het beschrijven en verduidelijken van de samenhang van ideeën van conflictoplossingen van Armeniërs en de Organisatie voor Veiligheid en Samenwerking in Europa (OVSE) en de Verenigde Naties (VN) als Track One Diplomatie.

Na een zorgvuldige bestudering van wetenschappelijke literatuur over het onderwerp, zijn drie verschillende methoden gebruikt om de ideeën van oplossingen te onderzoeken: een kwalitatieve inhoudsanalyse van officiële documenten van de OVSE en de VN wordt vergeleken met een kwantitatieve data-analyse van gestructureerde interviews en een kwalitatieve inhoudsanalyse van diepte-interviews met Armeniërs.

De ideeën van conflictoplossingen voor het Nagorno-Karabach conflict van de OVSE en VN verschillen in op aantal punten van de ideeën van Armeniërs. De ideeën zijn echter wel in meer opzichten vergelijkbaar. Een sterke samenhang bestaat tussen de ideeën van conflictoplossingen, ook al komen deze niet volledig met elkaar overeen. Het belangrijkste gedeelte idee is dat het conflict moet worden opgelost op een vreedzame wijze door vreedzame onderhandelingen, bij voorkeur met bemiddeling van de Minsk-Groep van de OVSE.

## Map of the region of Nagorno-Karabakh



Source: [www.euronews.com](http://www.euronews.com)

## List of abbreviations

AACA = Abovian Armenian Cultural Association  
AR = Armenia  
AZ = Azerbaijan  
CB = Caucasus Barometer  
CRRC = Caucasus Research Resource Centers  
CSCE = Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe  
OSCE = Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe  
GA = General Assembly of the United Nations  
NK = Nagorno-Karabakh  
NKR = 'Nagorno-Karabakh Republic'  
P5 = Permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations  
SC = Security Council of the United Nations  
SSR = Soviet Socialist Republic  
UN = United Nations  
US = United States

## List of tables

<i>No.</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Page</i>
1	Timeline of the history of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict	8
2	Themes and concepts of analysis of documents	13
3	Themes and concepts of analysis of structured interviews	15
4	Descriptive statistics	24

## Introduction

*“We strongly urge the leaders of the sides to prepare their populations for peace, not war [...]. Once an agreement has been reached, we stand ready to witness the formal acceptance of these Principles, to assist in the drafting of the peace agreement, and then to support its implementation with our international partners”* (Presidents of the OSCE Minsk Group, 2012: 2).

The above quote is a joint statement by the Presidents of the United States, Russia, and France on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It underscores the importance of a peaceful resolution between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh and at the same time emphasizes the importance of cooperation of the population after a resolution is officially made.

The territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh started about 25 years ago, primarily between the states of Armenia and Azerbaijan (De Waal, 2010). The region of Nagorno-Karabakh officially belongs to Azerbaijan, which invokes the right to territorial integrity<sup>1</sup>. However Armenia and the authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh desire the disputed region to become an independent state, based on the right to self-determination<sup>2</sup> (Cornell, 1999; Dehdashti-Rasmussen, 2006). International organisations, like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN) attempt to resolve the conflict by proposing agreements and drafting resolutions. Although since 1994 a ceasefire should appease the violence, the conflicting situation continues and the dispute has not yet been solved (Druckman & Moradian, 1999; Gamaghelyan, 2010) as “peace is not merely the absence of formal war” (Nordstrom, 2014: 141).

In order to make progress in the peace negotiations and stimulate the implementation of the already proposed ideas on conflict resolution, scholars such as Ghaplanyan (2010) argue that it is essential to examine whether or not people on the ground, which are involved, support the thoughts within Track One Diplomacy. According to different experts<sup>3</sup> Track One Diplomacy is known as the official attempts to dispute resolution and is the process of interaction between official representatives of states and official, governmental actions to resolve conflicts. Acceptance of formal ideas by citizens could play an effective role in the accomplishment of conflict resolution (Nordstrom, 2004; Ghaplanyan, 2010).

This research is about the cohesion between the ideas of conflict resolution for settling the territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh of Armenians and the OSCE and the UN within Track One Diplomacy. In order to investigate the cohesion it is important to examine the Track One Diplomacy of the OSCE and the UN, as these organisations are most essential international actors involved in the process of conflict resolution (Croissant, 1994; UAAS, 2013; AAA, 2013).

Firstly Track One Diplomacy is described. It is concurrently essential to explain the importance of international organisations in conflict resolution. Therefore the structure and role of the UN within the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are described. Moreover the structure and role of the OSCE are explained, as it is the most important mediator in the process of conflict resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh (Cornell, 1999). Thereafter the history and current situation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are described. In addition, the connection between Track One

---

<sup>1</sup> The concept of territorial integrity will be explained in chapter 2.1 about the United Nations.

<sup>2</sup> The concept of self-determination of peoples will be explained in chapter 2.1 about the United Nations.

<sup>3</sup> Mapendere, 2001; Chigas, 2005; Said & Lerche, 1995; Nan, 2003; Diamond & McDonald, 1991.

Diplomacy, local ideas and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is clarified. After carefully investigating academic literature on the topic, three different methods are used in this research to explore and compare the conceptualisations of resolutions. Firstly, a thematic content analysis of resolutions made by the OSCE and the UN is carried out in order to obtain an overview of the proposals of the official and formal diplomacy. Secondly, secondary data of a quantitative dataset of questionnaires is analysed, in which questions were asked to inhabitants of Armenia about their ideas of resolutions for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Lastly, the knowledge gained through the analysis of the questionnaires is deepened with semi-structured in-depth interviews. These interviews were held with Armenians<sup>4</sup> living in the Netherlands to talk about their points of view concerning their desired ways of resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In the conclusion the cohesion between the formal and ‘local’ ideas of conflict resolution is described and analysed.

### Definition of research problem

The focus of this research lies on the ideas of conflict resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The purpose of this research is to indicate the cohesion between the thoughts of resolution for settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between the Track One Diplomacy of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN) as actors in the international community and Armenians as actors on the ground. In order to compare the ideas of resolution it is important to analyse the Track One Diplomacy of the OSCE and the UN. Furthermore it is important to examine and analyse thoughts of conflict resolution of Armenian citizens. This thesis merely focuses on Armenian ideas; nevertheless it is also interesting to research other local viewpoints, such as Azerbaijani or citizens of Nagorno-Karabakh. Unfortunately within the time and effort of this research it is only possible to investigate one of the local sites in-depth. I choose the Armenian side because of the accessibility of the Dutch diaspora.

It could be expected that the ideas of conflict resolution differ in many ways, because within official Track One Diplomacy international organisations have to deal with principles and regulations of international law and politics (Böhmelt, 2010; Nan, 2003). However, Armenians are, as citizens able to propose resolutions without taking into account the legal regulations and political interests of the different formal actors involved. According to Saunders (1991) citizens are able to recognize the human dimensions of a conflict and could change the relationships among (ethnic) groups enough to permit formal negotiation or resolution of conflicts in a different and perhaps more effective way. By showing to what extent Armenians have different and/or similar views, this research holds the potential to contribute to the process of conflict resolution of settling the conflict. It further stipulates the academic claim that the engagement of citizens is important in conflict resolution (Ghaplanyan, 2010 and Nordstrom 2004).

### Research Questions

This research focuses on the differences and similarities of the ideas of conflict resolution of Armenians and of the policy of Track One Diplomacy. This thesis aims to develop insights on the cohesion of these views. As described above, it is essential to know whether or not the

---

<sup>4</sup> The Armenians, who will participate in this research, are originally from or lived in Armenia, however currently live in the Netherlands.

thoughts of resolution correspond, because of the importance of the engagement of Armenians on the proposed resolutions. The central question of this research reads:

What is the cohesion between the ideas of conflict resolution of Armenians and the ideas of conflict resolution that have been proposed by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN) as part of Track One Diplomacy for settling the territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh?

The main research question is divided into sub-questions, which all explore a different part of the main research question. Firstly, in order to answer the main research question it is needed to explore the meaning of Track One Diplomacy. Also, it will have to be described what the conflict is about. Therefore before investigating how the thoughts are written down in resolutions and agreements the following sub-questions will have to be answered:

- What is Track One Diplomacy?
- What is the role of the OSCE and the UN in territorial conflicts?
- What is the background of the territorial conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh?
- What is the role of Track One Diplomacy in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?

The four above-mentioned questions will be answered in chapter one of this research. It is assumed that based on the role of Track One Diplomacy in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it is important to explore the ideas of conflict resolution in the following questions:

- What are the ideas of conflict resolution that have been proposed by the OSCE and the UN in official resolutions for settling the territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh?
- What are the ideas of conflict resolution of Armenians for settling the territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh?

The answers of the two above-mentioned questions will follow from analysing the findings of the three methods that are described in the upcoming chapters. The views of Armenians are partly analysed quantitatively and therefore the following hypotheses are composed<sup>5</sup>:

1. Armenians prefer a solution by peaceful negotiations to a solution by force.
2. France, the European Union (EU), Russia and the United States could be clustered as a group of interrelated variables.
3. Gender, age, stratum, religion, trust in the UN, trust in the EU and the involvement of France, the European Union (EU), Russia, the United States and Turkey could predict whether Armenians support a solution by peaceful negotiation or by force.

In order to disclose and analyse the cohesion of the ideas of conflict resolution the following sub-questions have to be answered:

---

<sup>5</sup> The reasoning of why these hypotheses are constructed is shortly explained in subheading 3.2 Data-analysis.



- To what extent are the ideas of conflict resolution within Track One Diplomacy and of Armenians different for settling the territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh?
- To what extent are the ideas of conflict resolution within Track One Diplomacy and of Armenians comparable for settling the territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh?

The last two sub-questions are answered by combining the results of the qualitative content analysis of the Track One Diplomacy and structured and in-depth interviews with Armenians. By answering these sub-questions the cohesion between the ideas of conflict resolution is described and clarified, and consequently the main research question is answered.

### Relevance

Track One Diplomacy is a concept that has often been studied, however, mainly with the focus on the influence of international law and the power of the international community. Although it is important to comprehend these broad influences, it is also significant to understand the policies of Track One Diplomacy in comparison with the opinion of people on the ground. Scholars, such as Cornell (1999), Ghaplanyan (2010) and Gahramanova (2010) have been given academic attention to understand the differences and similarities in opinion of the ways of conflict resolution between different governmental actors involved in the case of the conflict in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Nonetheless, limited attention has been given to whether these resolutions are cohesive with the local thoughts on the ground. The ideas of (local) Armenians have not been investigated in-depth. In the Caucasus Barometer 2011 five questions were asked about these views, but the findings are not elaborated with qualitative research. Where citizens are interviewed, they are asked about their experiences and the influences of policies on the everyday lives. This research is thus relevant for the academic field to investigate the differences, similarities and the cohesion of the ideas of conflict resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Besides aiming to contribute to the academic body of knowledge, this research aims to be social relevant. Since 1988 there is a conflict in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Although negotiations of settling this territorial conflict already started in the 1990s, nonetheless no effective resolution has yet been found. A resolution made by the OSCE and UN as actor in the international community is only enforceable and feasible when people on the ground are willing to cooperate with the proposed solutions (Ghaplanyan, 2010, Cornell, 1999). In order to break the deadlock and make progress in the process of conflict resolution, this research could be useful to achieve more understanding in the ideas of Armenians. This research holds the potential to contribute to the process of peacebuilding and could therefore be social relevant.

Furthermore this research could be seen as preparation for the master's programmes of 'Law and Politics of International Security' and 'Conflict Resolution and Governance', which I will join after finishing this thesis. I am determined to develop a sound academic knowledge of the discourse and practices of international law, conflict resolution and politics. It is the ideal degree for me, as it aligns perfectly with my future ambitions.

### Interdisciplinarity

An essential aspect of interdisciplinary research is that the focus is not on the disciplines but on the problem or issue itself (Repko, 2008). Conflict resolution is of importance to several

disciplines, and this research upholds an interdisciplinary approach. Consequently, the focus of this research is on the cohesion of ideas of conflict resolution. To answer the abovementioned research questions it is necessary to acknowledge the contested space between the disciplines of primarily international law, politics and anthropology. The theoretical framework of this research is interdisciplinary because the practitioners and policy makers of Track One Diplomacy need to take into account different disciplines. The framework of international law is of importance in order to find resolutions, which do not conflict with the system of law and obligate actors involved to comply with the agreements. Therefore the interests of the different actors involved need to be taken into account within the field of politics, because international relations influence the thoughts of resolution proposed by states and other important stakeholders. In order to give adequate attention to cultural differences it is important to recognise these discrepancies of populations involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The methodology of this research upholds an interdisciplinary approach because the above-mentioned aspects of the disciplines are used to analyse Track One Diplomacy documents. In addition, the structured and in-depth interviews with Armenians discuss the views of people on the ground from an anthropological perspective, combining their political and legal views on conflict resolution. In short, by proposing and investigating ideas of conflict resolution there need to be awareness of the complexity of policies, interests, culture and systems of law. The foregoing demonstrates that the integration of different disciplines play an essential role investigating the cohesion of conceptualisations of conflict resolution.

## **Chapter 1: Theory and background**

In this chapter Track One Diplomacy, as well as the structure and role of both the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are described. Furthermore the history and current developments of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh provide an overview of the interests of the actors involved. Lastly, the influences of the UN and OSCE on the process of conflict resolution over Nagorno-Karabakh are discussed as part of Track One Diplomacy.

### 1.1 Theory

#### *1.1.1 Track One Diplomacy*

Track One Diplomacy has a long history and is practised in numerous political dialogues and discussions. High-ranking diplomat De Magalhães (1988) described Track One Diplomacy as:

“[...] an instrument of foreign policy for the establishment and development of contacts between governments of different states through the use of intermediaries mutually recognized by the respective parties” (De Magalhães, 1988: 59).

An important characteristic of Track One Diplomacy is its formal and official application at the state-to-state level. This diplomacy follows a protocol to which according to Mapendere (2001) every negotiating state must be a signatory. Yet, little is known about the “actual perceptions of the official parties” concerning official negotiations (Gürkaynak, 2007: 57).

Diplomats, heads of states and other high-ranking government officials carry out this official diplomacy. The term Track One Diplomacy or official diplomacy is often used to refer to peacebuilding activities conducted by governmental agencies, officially appointed representatives such as diplomats, and inter-governmental agencies such as the United Nations (Gürkaynak, 2007; Chigas, 1997; Said & Lerche, 1995). Track One Diplomacy provides room to discuss the different perceptions, norms and values to overcome the national differences between the communities or states. The purpose of the Track One Diplomacy is to provide a forum, in which steps towards establishing dialogue and negotiations are taking in order to identify ways to make peacebuilding efforts more effective, complementary and coordinated (Gürkaynak, 2007). Therefore it could be argued that Track One Diplomacy is a primary peacebuilding tool of states' foreign policies.

Track One Diplomacy can thus be conceptualised as a foreign policy tool developed with the objective to improve relations among states. The international organisations, which facilitate the forum of Track One Diplomacy, have the financial and material resources to provide high control in (conflict) negotiations and at the same time create a flexible environment of resources. Furthermore it has the (perceived) ability to use (political) power to influence the outcomes and direction of possible resolutions of negotiations (Saunders, 1991). According to Saunders (1991) and Mapendere (2001) the power of a state to use or threat with military force could influence the decisions of other states regarding resolutions and agreements. However, according to Gürkaynak (2007) the power of official Track One Diplomacy can also force people to stay within certain boundaries, because it has rigid rules and norms. These limitations could form barriers of communications and negotiation methods (Diamond & McDonald, 1991).

Furthermore, within the community of the Track One Diplomacy official diplomats need to include “[...] all interests and representative of and carrying the responsibility of the whole nation” (Gürkaynak, 2007: 77). Therefore, the official representatives have in-depth knowledge about the topic and the interests of the actors involved, because they use diverse sources of intelligence. Also, the mediators of the Track One Diplomacy have a wide-ranging and in-depth knowledge of the foreign policies of the (conflicting) states involved (Mapendere, 2001 and Stein & Lewis, 1996). Consequently, Track One Diplomacy could be used to stimulate conflict resolution by international organisations.

It could be argued that Track One Diplomacy has disadvantages and weaknesses as well. The increasing level of interactions between state officials raises further conflicting issues, which need to be analysed and challenged (Gürkaynak, 2007). Power structures and political interests influence the process of conflict resolution within Track One Diplomacy and therefore official representatives are restricted by “their allegiance to their political constituencies” (Mapendere, 2001: 67). It could be stated that because the officials have to represent their government instead of for themselves, it is hard to present and hold on to the original interests and intentions. Therefore, Track One officials may either be too rigid or delay negotiations (Saunders, 1991). Although Gürkaynak points out that Track One officials have to represent the whole nation, officials may not always represent all the different (ethnic) groups involved in a specific conflict because Track One Diplomacy is often headed by the power elites (Mapendere, 2001).

As already mentioned in the introduction, the definition of the Track One Diplomacy in this research is the official attempts to dispute resolution and is the process of interaction between official representatives of states and official, governmental actions to resolve conflicts (Mapendere, 2001; Chigas, 2005; Said & Lerche, 1995; Nan, 2003; Diamond & McDonald, 1991). The United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe are important institutes that provide a forum for Track One Diplomacy over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In the following subheadings these international organisations are described.

### *1.1.2. The United Nations*

In this subheading the United Nations (UN) is described as part of Track One Diplomacy. Consequently the structure and role of the Security Council (SC) and the General Assembly (GA) are described, as resolutions of these organs are analysed through a qualitative content analysis.

The UN, established in 1945, is an international organisation, which monitors the international peace and security by “developing friendly relations among nations” (UN, 2013). The UN is a so-called programme organisation, which plays a prominent role in arranging behavioural norms and rules, and in establishing international regimes (Rittberger and Zangl, 2006). The UN is a complex system and needs to reinvent itself continuously in accordance with the constant changes in the world. Many scholars such as Rittberger and Zangl (2006), Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (2005), Goldstein and Pevehouse (2009) and Weiss (2008) acknowledge the influence and capacity of the UN on international issues such as conflict resolution covered by the UN Charter. Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (2005: 326) emphasise the clear and constructive development of the UN by calling it a “truly global society of states”. Only a *de jure* independent state is able become a member of the UN and therefore it is important to keep in mind the principles of becoming a formal state defined in the Montevideo

Convention on Rights and Duties of States of 1933 (Hille, 2010a; Hille, 2010b Storey, 2001; Dixon, 2007).<sup>6</sup>

The UN Charter is the legal basis of the UN and formulates the purposes and principles of the UN and its main six bodies (Hille, 2010b; Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2009). The Charter is a binding international treaty and states can ratify it (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2009). Important terms in the UN Charter are the principles of self-determination of peoples as mentioned in Article 1.2 and territorial integrity of any state as mentioned in Article 2.4 (United Nations, 2006). Because the UN Charter is ambiguous on the meaning of these concepts, both the right to self-determination and territorial integrity could result in discussions about its interpretation (Emerson, 1971). In this thesis the principle of self-determination of peoples or self-determination refers to the “unilateral right of secession” (Supreme Court of Canada, 1998: 281)<sup>7</sup>. In this thesis the norm of territorial integrity means “the growing respect for the proscription that force should not be used to alter interstate boundaries” (Zacher, 2001: 215).<sup>8</sup> According to Zacher (2001) the concept of sovereignty is interconnected with territorial integrity as it also contains the importance of respecting and controlling state borders. Sovereignty is the right of a state “to rule over its territory and the people within its borders without external interference” (Storey, 2001: 35).<sup>9</sup>

One of the main bodies of the UN is the General Assembly (GA), in which all 193 member states are represented with equal votes (Peterson, 2008; UN, 2013). Many member states believe the Assembly is a forum for discussion by which it provides “a partial counterpoise to the Security Council (SC) through its authority to discuss general conditions of peace and comment on particular conflicts” (Peterson, 2008: 98). The GA has different authorities and tasks concerning administrative and organisational matters, and global deliberation (Peterson, 2008 and Hille, 2010b) and according to the UN itself discusses “any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security” (United Nations, 2006: 13). It is important to understand the status of the resolutions of the GA as these are investigated in this research. Therefore the focus lies solely on the GA authority to adopt resolutions. Article 10 of the UN Charter allows the GA to adopt resolutions as recommendations to address to member states or the SC (United Nations, 2006). This means that the GA can discuss any matter however their

---

<sup>6</sup> The Montevideo Convention was adopted in 1933 in order to provide “criteria that could be used in order to assess whether an entity could be regarded as a state. [...] These conditions must be in order to be called a state” (Hille, 2010a: 27). There are four essential conditions that should be there: a territory, a permanent population, an effective government and recognition of other states or the capacity to have relations with other states (Dixon, 2007; Hille 2010a; Hille 2010b; Storey, 2001). Without complying with the last criteria of recognition a entity could declare itself de facto independent, however will not be de jure independent until recognized by the other states (Dixon, 2007).

<sup>7</sup> There is no straightforward definition of the concept of self-determination. The Supreme Court of Canada defined the definition used in this research, in its judgment of the case on the Secession of Quebec. This definition refers to the concept of the external right of self-determination or also called secession (Hille, 2010a). Hille (2010a: 37) defines secession as “the breakaway of a unit to form a new state out of part of an existing state”. Another type of self-determination is the internal self-determination. The Supreme Court of Canada also gives a clear definition of the right to internal self-determination: “a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state”. Although the distinction between external and internal self-determination is important to understand, in this research self-determination refers to the external self-determination.

<sup>8</sup> There is no straightforward definition of the concept of territorial integrity. In this thesis the definition of Zacher (2001) is used, because this definition includes the importance of the development of the norm to respect states' territorial integrity and I believe territorial integrity is a norm.

<sup>9</sup> There is no straightforward definition of the concept of sovereignty. In this thesis the definition of Storey (2001) is used, because of its broad perspective. With this definition Storey emphasizes the possibility that states are spatially bounded entities and not static. He suggests that, although states have the right to sovereignty and self-determination “states can be seen as dynamic entities, shaped and re-shaped through the interactions of human political activity” (Storey, 2001:39). His definition provides room to different interpretations of the permanency and changeability of borders and territory.

resolutions are not binding. There is room for states to implement the resolutions in their own way and therefore the GA has little power (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2009). The SC should discuss an issue in order to enforce decisions (Hille, 2010b).

The SC is one of the main bodies of the UN and consists of 15 members (UN, 2013; Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2009).<sup>10</sup> Under the UN Charter the SC has the “primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security” and has to act “in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations” (United Nations, 2006: 20). The SC is the most powerful organ of the UN, because under Article 25 of the UN Charter its decisions are binding on all member states (Malone, 2008; United Nations, 2006). This means that member states have to comply with, accept and carry out all decisions and resolutions made by the SC.

In short, the UN is a powerful international organisation dealing with any matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. In the UN Charter Chapter VIII special attention is given to regional arrangements, in order to encourage regional agencies to settle local disputes peacefully under the authority of the UN (United Nations, 2006). By means of these principles the UN utilizes the knowledge and expertise of regional agencies, such as the OSCE and keeps fully informed of activities undertaken by these agencies.

### *1.1.3 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe*

This subheading particularly explains the position of the Minsk-Group, as this organ promotes finding a political resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (OSCE, 2013). In 1972 the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), predecessor of the OSCE, was established in order to react to “the threat of war and violent conflict as well as with stabilising the peace” in the aftermath of the Cold War (Rittberger and Zangl, 2006: 31). Rittberger and Zangl (2006: 31) even call the CSCE a “European UN”, because it is concerned with the development of collective and regional security of Europe. However, the purpose to create a regional security system failed and nowadays the OSCE focuses on conflict prevention and crisis management. The OSCE is, as the UN, a programme organisation, although the authority of the OSCE is not as strongly binding as decisions made by the SC of the UN (Rittberger and Zangl, 2006). According to Rittberger and Zangl (2006) the OSCE has a “loosely binding” decision-making authority, which means that the OSCE does not have a strong obligatory power on its member states. In 1992, under the UN Charter Chapter VIII, the OSCE was formally acknowledged as a regional security organisation, given them more power and strength because of the support of the UN. According to Carment and Fischer (2009) this recognition is important since internal conflicts are complex and require regional solutions with a regional dimension.

In 1975 the Helsinki Principles were established within the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, 2013; Hille, 2010a and Rittberger and Zangl, 2006). The Helsinki Principles or Basic Principles form the basis of the purposes of the CSCE and OSCE, and provide a guideline for actions of and promises to its members (CSCE, 1975, De Waal, 2010). In many summits and other important documents of the OSCE the Basic Principles are cited or emphasised by different bodies of the OSCE<sup>11</sup>.

---

<sup>10</sup> Five members of the SC are permanent and have veto-power on non-procedural issues (France, the United States, China, Russian Federation and the United Kingdom), and ten are non-permanent and elected for two years (Malone, 2008; Hille, 2010b, Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2009 and United Nations, 2006).

<sup>11</sup> The Basic Principles of the OSCE (1975) are:

One of the most important bodies of the OSCE is the Minsk-Group, which is established in 1992 in Minsk. According to Maresca (1994) the Minsk-Group is responsible to support a peaceful solution by bringing the parties to the negotiating table. The OSCE (2013) explains:

“The Minsk Group spearheads the OSCE's efforts to find a political solution to the conflict in and around Nagorno-Karabakh involving Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is co-chaired by France, the Russian Federation and the United States” (OSCE, 2013:1).

The main goal of the Minsk-Group is to provide a framework for conflict resolution by mediating during negotiations and assuring the continuation of a peace process (Ronzitti, 1997; Cornell, 1999). Therefore the Minsk-Group could also be seen “as guarantor of the final settlement” (Zartman and Toufal, 1996: 450).

According to an employee of the OSCE (joint) statements of the Presidents of the Minsk-Group are not legally binding upon the parties involved in the issue nor have any legal effect on anybody (Nemcova, 2013a)<sup>12</sup>. However, these statements are never published without the agreement of all the parties involved. Moreover according to Nemcova summits and declarations have the same legal force as the statements. In short, the Minsk-Group is a mediating organ, which provides a forum for negotiations between parties concerning disputed issues and the Minsk-Group assists Armenia and Azerbaijan in resolving the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

## 1.2 Background of Nagorno-Karabakh

### *1.2.1 Historical Background*

The history of the conflict and the interests of the different actors involved are described in this subheading<sup>13</sup>. In 1921 Jozef Stalin appointed the Nagorno-Karabakh region to the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) (Cornell, 1999; Croissant, 1998). At the time, the Armenian SSR authorities desired to assume a peaceful unification with Armenia (Druckman & Moradian, 1999; De Waal, 2010), leaving Nagorno-Karabakh the subject of an interstate conflict (De Waal, 2010). Nonetheless Armenia's interest currently focuses on the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh based on the right to self-determination. Moreover it wants to guarantee safety and security of the Armenian populated territories in the region (Matveena, 2002; Hunter, 2006). According to the Advisory Council on International Affairs (2005) Armenia desires to improve its relations with the EU and therefore does its best to enlarge the influence of the OSCE (Lobjakas, 2009). Azerbaijan rules out the independency of Nagorno-Karabakh and invokes the right to territorial integrity (Chorbaijan, 2001; Cornell, 1999). As the Nagorno-Karabakh

- 
- Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty
  - Refraining from the threat or use of force
  - Inviolability of frontiers
  - Territorial integrity of States
  - Peaceful settlement of disputes
  - Non-intervention in internal affairs
  - Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief
  - Equal rights and self-determination of peoples
  - Cooperation among States
  - Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law

<sup>12</sup> A. Nemcova, personal communication, March 18, 2013.

<sup>13</sup> Table 1, which could be found in the end of the next subheading provides an overview of the historical and current events in Nagorno-Karabakh.

territory officially belongs to Azerbaijan, it believes it has the right to claim the region (Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, 1994; De Waal, 2010). Because of these contradictory interests, there is a conflict over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh between the current states of Azerbaijan and Armenia (Croissant, 1998).

According to Shirinov (2011) the conflict remained respectively non-violent until 1988, but awakened in 1988 with inter-ethnic tensions and violent clashes (Cornell, 1999). Different attempts of Azerbaijan, Armenia and the Soviet Union were imposed to settle the dispute by force, and the situation revealed in an escalation of violence, warfare and military intervention (Croissant, 1998). The conflict is one of the “most intractable clashes to emerge from the break-up of the Soviet empire” (Croissant, 1998: xi).

Scholars of Armenia and Azerbaijan disagree about the ethnic history of Nagorno-Karabakh (Croissant, 1998). Because this thesis focuses on ideas of Armenians relevant beliefs and affinities of Armenians are described. Armenians in both Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh remained to have broadly shared religion, culture and traditions despite Nagorno-Karabakh’s attachment to Azerbaijan (Croissant, 1998). Armenians in Armenia continued to have a strong nationalistic and emotional attachment to Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. Moreover, according to Donabedian (2004) cited in Croissant (1998: 13) Armenians believe Nagorno-Karabakh is the stronghold and refuge where their traditions continued to preserve uninterrupted by foreign rule.

After the break-up of the Soviet Union the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh became wrapped up with difficult regional and geopolitical dynamics and rivalries among Iran, Turkey and the Russian Federation or Russia. The conflict could be seen “as a potential treat to regional peace and security and as a potential opportunity through which to gain geopolitical influence” (Croissant, 1998: xii). Iran’s interest is to gain influence in the region, especially in Azerbaijan and its natural resources, and attempts to reduce US’ influence in the region (Barbolet et al, 2004; Croissant, 1998). Turkey struggles to balance their economic and political interests, whereby it desires to neutralise Russia’s influence in the region (Gamaghelyan, 2010). Russia emerges regional order and wants to enlarge its influence and power in this oil rich region. At the same time Russia supports both Armenia and Azerbaijan in order to keep its good relations (Matveena, 2002; Croissant, 1998). Moreover, as one of the Presidents of the Minsk-Group it plays a substantial role within the peace process and negotiations (OSCE, 2013). Nonetheless, according to Matveena (2002) the real intensions of Russia are doubtful:

“[...] two main bodies conduct negotiations to end the fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh: the OSCE Minsk Group and the Russian government. Many observers believe Russia's peacemaking efforts conflict with and even undermine those of the OSCE Minsk Group especially over the issue of peacekeeping and monitoring forces” (Matveena, 2002: 139).

After a referendum Nagorno-Karabakh declared itself independent in 1991 as the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) (UAAS, 2013 & Dehdashti-Rasmussen, 2006). Nonetheless, following the criteria’s of the Montevideo Convention<sup>14</sup> the NKR is not an officially recognised

---

<sup>14</sup> As mentioned in subheading 1.1.2. The United Nations.



state (Dixon, 2007; Hille 2010a; Hille 2010b). According to Sahakyan (2013) the NKR is the most important actor, because the conflict is on the Nagorno-Karabakh territory itself. The interest of the NKR is to become a de jure independent state (Cornell, 1999; OSCE, 2013). Croissant pays attention to the “world community’s preference for the principle of territorial integrity over that of self-determination” (1998:132). He claims that the possibility of recognition of the NKR by the international community has therefore ended.

Between 1988 and 1994 inter-communal violence, treats and “brutal combat left more than twenty-five thousand people dead and nearly a million homeless” (Croissant, 1998: xii). Therefore, only two years after its establishment, the Minsk-Group suggested ending the violence immediately by proposing an agreement (OSCE, 2013). Consequently, in May 1994 an agreement was signed to arrange a ceasefire, which should appease outbreaks of violence (Gamaghelyan, 2010; De Waal, 2008). It includes “OSCE-sponsored international monitoring, the lifting of all blockades, aiding refugees and displaced persons, and ultimately negotiating the status of Nagorno-Karabakh” (Maresca, 1994: 4). The agreement is still in force today, although recent developments show a handful of relatively small violations (Gamaghelyan, 2010; Freizer, 2011).

### *1.2.2 Recent developments in the Nagorno-Karabakh struggle*

The current situation in Nagorno-Karabakh shows the conflict is frozen because of the cease-fire, although fights and struggles occur occasionally. In order to provide an overview of the most important historical and current events a timeline is included in the end of this subheading.

With the establishment of the ceasefire agreement the current situation of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh stabilised because the peace process and negotiating talks began. Nevertheless the internationally recognised principles of self-determination and territorial integrity created an immediate deadlock in the negotiations. “Although the ceasefire has been observed generally to the present day, a formal political settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has remained elusive” (Croissant, 1998: xii). Additionally due to the geopolitical agenda of the mediating actors, the process is influenced by multifaceted interests, which complicated the peace talks even more (Croissant, 1998; Mirzoyan, 2012). De Waal (2010: 15) describes the problem as “mutual insecurity”. Although the violent war ended in May 1994, there is no peace (De Waal, 2008; De Waal, 2010) and the political dispute is unresolved (De Waal, 2003).

Human Rights Watch (1994) argues that recent developments in the region demonstrate that violations of the ceasefire occur regularly on either side of the conflict. The report of the Human Rights Watch (1994) demonstrates serious and important developments such as the increasing of practices of hostage taking in the region. News and information agencies<sup>15</sup> owned by different involved actors publish articles about violations of the ceasefire and on-going conflicting occurrences in the border area. There are also developments, which contribute to finding a solution.

In 1997, the worst fighting since the ceasefire broke out and soldiers died on both sides. As a result of this, the conflicting parties were brought back to the negotiation table by the Minsk-Group. Since then the Presidents of the Minsk-Group proposed different peace plans,

---

<sup>15</sup> News.Az, 2013a; RFE/RL, 2013; Soderberg, 2012; Taylor-Line, 2011; NKR MFA Press Service, 2012; BBC News, 2012.

which all failed in resolving the conflict (Croissant, 1998). According to the Defence Minister of the NKR of 1997, cited in Croissant (1998):

“[...] a solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh question is likely to be reached only be forced – i.e., that military action will either produce the outright defeat of one of the parties or create the necessary conditions for genuine compromise [...]” (Croissant, 1998: 124).

This quote indicates that the process of peaceful negotiations is not constructive and hence the official representative of the NKR believes a solution should be found by force instead of by peaceful negotiations with the Minsk-Group. Nordstrom (2004: 181) explains that such an undesirable process as in Nagorno-Karabakh can be changed into a constructive development and positively describes, “[...] peace begins when people find violence the worst threat of all.” Although there is no concrete prospect of a solution and a constant treat of violence endures in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, formal and local ideas could generate progress in finding a resolution to the conflict. The role, which the formal and local ideas could play in the conflict are described in the next subheading.

Table 1: Timeline of the history of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

1921:	1988 - 1994:	1991:	1992:	1994:	1996:	1997 - now:	Now:	Future:
Appointment NK to AZ	Violent clashes between AZ and AR	De facto independence of NKR	Creation Minsk-Group	Cease-fire Agreement	Start mediations by Co-Chairs Minsk-Group	Cease-fire violations	Frozen conflict	?

### 1.2.3 Role of Track One Diplomacy and local ideas

The international community tried to defuse the conflict with resolutions and peaceful solutions since the clash in 1997 (Croissant, 1998). Both the UN and OSCE are involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as facilitators of a forum of Track One Diplomacy. The UN completed four SC and two GA resolutions about the conflict in order to stimulate the progress of the peace process. In the binding SC resolutions only demands, requests and concerns are expressed, which means that no direct solutions or decisions are made about the resolution of the conflict (De Waal, 2010). The GA discussed the conflict several times in two different ways. First it focused on the situation and humanitarian aid on the ground in Nagorno-Karabakh and secondly the international assistance to refugees and displaced persons were discussed (UN, 2013).

According to the Foreign Minister in the Government of Azerbaijan, the Minsk-Group must remain to be directly involved in the negotiations of conflict resolution (News AZ, 2013b). The Minsk-Group tries to bring all the involved parties to the negotiating table in order to achieve progress in resolving the conflict. They organised numerous official international conferences in order to stimulate collaboration and mutual understanding between Azerbaijan and Armenia (Faber and Kasprzyk, 2003). During several formal meetings, negotiations and visits of state representatives, the actors tried to agree on a solution. Unfortunately these occasions did not accomplish any form of solution to the conflict (NKRUSA, 2012). The NKR is no official party in the negotiations arranged by the Minsk-Group, which keeps a constant

disagreement over the format of the negotiations because of mutual contradictory positions (De Waal, 2010; OSCE, 2013). The peace negotiations did result in Azerbaijan agreeing on a special status for Nagorno-Karabakh within their state and guaranteeing the security of the population in this region (Croissant, 1998). However, the political state of affairs of Nagorno-Karabakh remains to play a central role in the negotiations. The individual states that are members of the OSCE, as well as Iran and Turkey welcome a renewal of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and therefore still support the peace negotiations (Croissant, 1998). Track One Diplomacy still focuses on peaceful ways of negotiations, although economic and political interests also influences the behaviour of the actors involved. Although the Minsk-Group is supposedly a neutral mediator, it can be argued that the strategic agendas of the Presidents do complicate the peace process.

The Co-Chairs of the Minsk-Group are also permanent members of the SC, which gives them the responsibility to maintain international peace and security and act under the principles and purposes of both the UN Charter and the Helsinki Act (UN, 2013; Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2009). Consequently because of the twofold mediating position of the co-chairs, the UN will never take position in the conflict nor suggest a specific solution to the conflict (Croissant 1998). The UN could assist with implementing a resolution made by Azerbaijan and Armenia in cooperation with the Minsk-Group.

Besides Track One Diplomacy, local ideas should play an essential role in finding a resolution to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. In order to enforce and implement a possible formal final resolution it could be argued that local ideas of people on the ground<sup>16</sup> about resolving the conflict are important to take into account (Cornell, 1999; Ghaplanyan, 2010; Nordstrom, 2004). According to Arnstein (1969: 216) the opinion and involvement of citizens can “encourage a more enlightened dialogue” between the actors involved. Therefore he argues local ideas and knowledge are indispensable and should be entangled in proposed peace plans. Arnstein emphasises local ideas could affect the outcome of the process in a positive way. Additionally, Cobb (2003) explains understanding local ideas and narratives could support formal actors in finding a peaceful solution. In my opinion, it could therefore be said that the ideas proposed within the OSCE and UN as part of Track One Diplomacy could result in more constructive negotiations, when the local ideas of, inter alia, Armenians are more entangled in the proposals.

In short, although different actors within Track One Diplomacy accomplished to prevent the conflict from further escalation, the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh has not been resolved. Armenia and Azerbaijan still negotiate with the OSCE as mediator on a peaceful solution. Knowledge about and taking into account local ideas of Armenians could ease the process of finding a resolution, because a proposal is only enforceable with cooperation of people on the ground (Ghaplanyan, 2010, Cornell, 1999). As long as the conflict “goes on without formal resolution, the potential will exist for the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute to explode into a regional war between rival blocs, resulting in a crisis of possibly global proportions” (Croissant, 1998: xiii). In the next chapters I aim to provide insights in the different ideas and points of view of resolutions to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh by analysing official documents of the OSCE and UN, and exploring the ideas of Armenians.

---

<sup>16</sup> The focus of this thesis is on the ideas of Armenians, as one of the actors on the ground.

## Chapter 2: Methodology

In this chapter the methodology of this research is elaborated and substantiated. The strategy used for this thesis is mixed methods research. I have opted for a mixed methods approach, combining qualitative and quantitative methodology in order to provide a better understanding in the cohesion between the different points of view of conflict resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The use of mixed methods enhances the credibility of the findings and furthermore the qualitative data could deepen the findings of the quantitative data (Bryman, 2008).

The design used in the research is a case study (Bryman, 2008). The purpose of using this framework for collecting and analysing data is to conduct a detailed and intensive analysis of conflict resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has continued for years already and the current way of conflict resolution has no resolving power or capacity. Although the findings derived from the analysis cannot be generalised, a case study is interesting because it provides a great amount of detailed description about this particular case.

The research methods used are a qualitative content analysis, a quantitative secondary analysis and qualitative interviews. A qualitative content analysis of official policy documents of the OSCE and the UN is compared with the view of Armenians, in order to investigate the mutual cohesion and explore the diversity of these different points of view. The view of Armenians is described with a quantitative secondary analysis of a Caucasus Barometer and qualitative individual in-depth interviews to enhance the quantitative findings. In this way the data that is generated is being used to reflect on the cohesion of Track One Diplomacy and Armenians.

### 2.1. Data-collection

#### 2.1.1 *Qualitative content analysis*

Qualitative content analysis is used to investigate Track One Diplomacy of the OSCE and UN. It is a research method by which (official) documents can be analysed to investigate the underlying themes and codes (Bryman, 2008). To carry out the qualitative content analysis a thematic way of analysis is used. This approach to interpret documents illustrates the categories of documents by coding themes and has an emphasis on what is said in these documents. A theme is built up out of codes or subthemes. The purpose of this method is to construct an index of subthemes within the central theme of conflict resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.<sup>17</sup>

A thematic qualitative content analysis is carried out on resolutions and proposals made by the UN, and several official statements of the (presidents of the) Minsk-Group of the OSCE<sup>18</sup>. The documents, which are collected to analyse, are sampled with a snowball approach. Both an Armenian and an Azerbaijani association described the same UN resolutions and OSCE documents on conflict resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh as important (UAAS, 2013 and AAA, 2013). These resolutions and documents referred to other resolutions and documents, of which the useful ones are sampled for this research as well. It was hard to sample all the relevant documents of the OSCE, because not all agreements and negotiations are agreed upon as being official documents. An employee of the OSCE provided me a list of all the documents of which decisions are reached by consensus, which means that they are considered as official and are made

---

<sup>17</sup> The thematic way of constructing (sub)themes is clarified in subheading 2.2.

<sup>18</sup> A list of all the analysed documents could be found in appendix 2.

available to the public (Nemcova, 2013a)<sup>19</sup>. Therefore only the officially declared statements and summits of the OSCE are sampled for this research. These statements and summits are of importance because they summarise the negotiations and mediations (Nemcova, 2013b)<sup>20</sup>. Moreover different organs within the OSCE have published statements and summits. In this research only the official documents of the OSCE Minsk-Group are sampled, because the Minsk-Group is the most important OSCE organ involved in the mediations on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Cornell, 1999 and Faber & Kasprzyk, 2003). Furthermore a resolution is collected from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), because this resolution is about the involvement of the OSCE in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict<sup>21</sup>.

### *2.1.2 Quantitative structured interviews*

The quantitative method used in this research consists of a secondary data-analysis of structured interviews, which is an interview in which the context of questioning is exactly same for each respondent (Bryman, 2008). The data of the structured interviews comes from the Caucasus Barometer (CB) in association with the Program of the Eurasia Partnership Foundation. The Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC) collects this empirical data annually in the countries of the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia). The priority of the CRRC (2011) is to provide reliable data on demographic, social, political and economic variables related to the region. The CB data is filtered by country and therefore it is possible to focus on merely the Armenian opinion. The structured interviews were carried out in the local language and conducted within the households of the respondents.

In 2011 the CB included five questions, which inquire views on conflict resolution over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh<sup>22</sup>. The CB is based on the same methodological approach every year. The measurement level is mainly interval, because most of the questions that are used of the structured interviews are based on a Likert scale and there is no absolute zero-point. The general question about age is ratio and the questions on gender, stratum, and religion are ordinal.<sup>23</sup> Except for questions related to the topic, the rest of the data in the CB, which are not related to this research, is not used. The opinion on how to resolve to conflict is interesting, because there are many attempts to resolve the conflict since the 1994 ceasefire however the conflict has not yet been solved. The results of this CB provide a clear picture of the difficulties that need to be vanquished.

Since the quantitative research method is a secondary analysis, there is no need to sample respondents. The data used for this secondary analysis is, as noted above, an analysis of the CB 2011. For this CB in Armenia 2365 respondents participated in the face-to-face structured interviews. A multi-stage cluster sampling approach on nine geographical units within Armenia selected the respondents.

---

<sup>19</sup> A. Nemcova, personal communication, March 18, 2013.

<sup>20</sup> A. Nemcova, personal communication, March 25, 2013.

<sup>21</sup> The resolution of the PACE is analysed with the OSCE documents, because it refers more to the OSCE than to the UN.

<sup>22</sup> The questions about the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh are described in appendix 1.

<sup>23</sup> The variables are described in subheading 2.2 'Quantitative secondary data-analysis'.

### *2.1.3 Qualitative In-depth interviews*

In this research interviews are held with nine first and two-second generation Armenians, who currently live in the Netherlands, in order to provide sufficient knowledge of ideas of conflict resolution. Unfortunately it is not possible to travel to the region itself and hold interviews within the period of this bachelor thesis. A purposive snowball sampling approach is employed to sample the interviewees, which means that a strategic way of searching is used in order to find participants<sup>24</sup> who are relevant for the research topic and research questions (Bryman, 2008). The sampling is characterised by making contact with the Abovian Armenian Cultural Association (AACA) in The Hague and student association ASV Gladzor in Utrecht. The participants live geographical scattered through the Netherlands, the age varies from 18 until 64 year of which three are women and eight are men. Nine of the eleven participants are in contact with Armenians living in Armenia, which assumes that these participants are aware of and informed about the current situation in Armenia. Therefore it is presumed that their ideas of conflict resolution are comparable with the existing views among Armenians in Armenia itself. Furthermore the Armenian Ambassador Ms. Dziunik Aghajanian is interviewed in order to illustrate the official Armenian thoughts of conflict resolution as part of Track One Diplomacy<sup>25</sup>.

An approach of triangulation is used, because the in-depth interviews are complementary to the structured interviews. The content of the interview guide aroused from both the themes of the qualitative content analysis and the main concepts the gathered in the secondary analysis of the structured interviews. For the purpose of consistency, the same structure is maintained for all interviews. The interviews consisted of semi-structured questions and open questions in order to pursue a guideline and at the same time provide the participants the opportunity to talk about the themes and concepts they consider as important<sup>26</sup>.

On February 24, 2013 Caucasus expert C. Hill gave a lecture on 25 years of struggle in Nagorno-Karabakh, by which Armenians living in the Netherlands were present at the AACA. During this lecture the atmosphere was tense, however it provided me the opportunity to become familiar with the sphere and environment of my sample population. Because the topic of this thesis is sensitive, tension could sometimes be felt during the interviews. Throughout an interview the tension decreased and the topic could be openly discussed.<sup>27</sup>

## 2.2 Data-analysis

### *2.2.1 Qualitative content analysis*

The analysis of the resolutions and agreements of the OSCE and the UN consists of different stages. The resolutions are read and analysed in-depth through a thematic approach. Firstly, reading the documents several times decided the (distinction between the) central themes. These themes formed the basis of the analysis as well as the main concepts in this research. Subsequently, the central themes are divided into several subthemes. The subthemes are the result of in-depth and carefully reading and rereading of the official documents. By dividing the themes in subthemes a selective or targeted way of coding is used. According to Charmaz (2006)

---

<sup>24</sup> The persons, who take part in the qualitative in-depth interviews, are mentioned as participants, in contrast to the description as respondents in the quantitative structured interviews.

<sup>25</sup> The Question content of the interview could be found in appendix 3.

<sup>26</sup> The Question content of the interviews could be found in appendix 4.

<sup>27</sup> The ethical considerations involved in this research are described in subheading 2.3 in order to take into account the sensitivity of the topic.

this way of coding accentuated the most common topics in the data. These topics or subthemes could be seen as revealing and useful data. In order to categorise in a correct and complete way it is required to make decisions about which topics contain the most analytical content. On the basis of the subthemes, the documents are then re-examined and evaluated. In this research the subthemes are mentioned as concepts. The themes and concepts are put in different overviews. On the basis of each concept the official documents are re-examined. Each concept is elaborate on a specific part of the content of the official documents.

After having constructed the themes and concepts, the documents of the OSCE and the UN are analysed separately with the same concepts. In order to make conclusions without merging the intentions and thoughts of these organisations, it is important to make a distinction of the ideas. Also, because the UN documents are made before the 1994 ceasefire and the OSCE are created after this agreement. It is assumed that the content of these documents are therefore not totally combinable. In table two the meaning and content of the themes and concepts are explained.

*Table 2: Themes and concepts of analysis of documents*

<b>Theme + concepts</b>	<b>Description</b>
<i>Theme 1: Involvement</i>  1. OSCE  2. UN  3. Directly involved actors  4. Other actors	This theme is about the actors involved in resolving the conflict according to the official documents. : This concept consists of the involvement of the OSCE and its organs. : This concept refers to the UN involvement and its organs. : This concept is about the resolving involvement of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. : This concept refers to the involvement of other states or organisations.
<i>Theme 2: Principles</i>  1. Self-determination  2. Territorial integrity  3. Security	This theme consists of the important principles mentioned in the documents as significant to take into account during the process of conflict resolution. : This concept contains references to the right to self-determination of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh. : This concept is about the comments on the right to territorial integrity of the state of Azerbaijan. : This concept is about ideas of protection and safeguarding situations.
<i>Theme 3: Accountability</i>  1. Engagement  2. Demands  3. Sources	This theme is about the responsibility and accountability to resolve the conflict. : This concept is about the promises and commitment to find a conflict resolution. : This concept refers to the requests, calls and concerns, which are described as important in resolving the conflict. : This conflict encloses the sources of law and obligations,

	which need to be taken into account during the resolving process.
<i>Theme 4: Way of resolution</i> 1. Humanitarian matters  2. Settlement  3. Forcibility  4. Time	This theme is about the proposed ways of resolving. : This concept is about the rights of people and the circumstances, which are essential to notify within conflict resolution. : This concept is about concrete ideas of how to allocate the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. : This concept describes mentions of resolving the conflict by force or forcibly interference of external parties. : This concept consists of the influence of time on the conflict and the timeframe it takes to resolve the conflict

### 2.2.2 Quantitative structured interviews

In order to analyse the quantitative structured interviews SPSS is used. With this computer program different statistical analyses are carried out. First of all, descriptive statistics are used in order to describe percentages, modes and means of the answers to the questions on Nagorno-Karabakh. Thereafter explanatory statistics are carried out in order to answer the hypotheses mentioned in the subheading Research Questions. The first hypothesis<sup>28</sup> is tested by a Pearson's *r* test and a dependent t-test of the variables by peaceful negotiations and by force. Combining the outcomes of these tests with a logistic regression provide an answer. The conflicting situation before the 1994 ceasefire agreement killed and hurt thousands of Armenians (De Waal, 2010). Therefore, it could be expected that Armenians prefer a solution by peaceful negotiations. Conducting a Principle Component Analysis tests the second hypothesis<sup>29</sup>. Because the Presidents of the Minsk-Group are France (as representative of the European Union), Russia and the United States, I assumed that these variables could be clustered as a group of interrelated variables. Lastly, the third hypothesis<sup>30</sup> is tested with a logistic regression using the dichotomous variable 'peaceforce', in which the respondents are categorised in two groups: supporters of a solution by peaceful negotiation (coded as 1) and by force (coded as 0). The logistic regression is carried out with three models, which are described in 3.2.1.2. Explanatory statistics.

### 2.2.3 Qualitative in-depth interviews

The interviews are analysed in the same way as the official documents, thus a thematic analysis is carried out on the semi-structured interviews. Before analysing the written interview transcripts all participants are given the opportunity to provide feedback and essential additions on the transcript and quotations, which are used for the analysis. In this manner, it is tried to avoid misunderstandings and miscommunications. Also, the triangulation of the quantitative and

<sup>28</sup> Armenians prefer a solution by peaceful negotiations over a solution by force.

<sup>29</sup> France, the European Union (EU), Russia and the United States could be clustered as a group of interrelated variables.

<sup>30</sup> Gender, age, stratum, religion, trust in the UN, trust in the EU and the involvement of France, the European Union (EU), Russia, the United States and Turkey could predict whether Armenians support a solution by peaceful negotiation or by force.



qualitative interviews enhanced the confidence in the ensuing findings (Bryman, 2008)<sup>31</sup>. The meaning and content of the themes and concepts are explained in the table below.

*Table 3: Themes and concepts of analysis of structured interviews*

<b>Theme + concepts</b>	<b>Description</b>
<p><i>Theme 1: Involvement</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. International Organisations</li> <li>2. Azerbaijan</li> <li>3. Armenia</li> <li>4. Nagorno-Karabakh</li> <li>5. Other actors</li> </ol>	<p>This theme is about the actors involved in resolving the conflict according to Armenians.</p> <p>: This concept is about the involvement of the OSCE and UN as international organisations.</p> <p>: This concept refers to the role of government of Azerbaijan in resolving the conflict.</p> <p>: This concept is about the role of the government of Armenia in resolving the conflict.</p> <p>: This concept is about the role of the authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh in resolving the conflict.</p> <p>: This concept refers to the involvement of other actors.</p>
<p><i>Theme 2: Principles</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Self-determination</li> <li>2. Sources</li> <li>3. Ceasefire</li> <li>4. Time</li> </ol>	<p>This theme consists of the principles mentioned as important during the process of conflict resolution.</p> <p>: See table 3.1.</p> <p>: See table 3.1.</p> <p>: This concept is about the influence and impact of the 1994 ceasefire agreement.</p> <p>: See table 3.1.</p>
<p><i>Theme 3: Way of resolution</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Peaceful negotiations</li> <li>2. Settlement</li> <li>3. Forcibility</li> <li>4. Solution</li> </ol>	<p>This theme is about the proposed ways of resolving.</p> <p>: The concept is about the likeliness and the different solutions of conflict resolution by peaceful negotiations.</p> <p>: See table 3.1.</p> <p>: The concept is about the likeliness and the different solutions of conflict resolution by force.</p> <p>: This concept describes the ideas of resolution the participants would suggest as solution.</p>

### 2.3 Ethical considerations

Ethical considerations could have arisen in the qualitative part of this research, in which in-depth interviews are held with Armenians living in the Netherlands to talk about their points of view concerning their desired ways of resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As relatives of the participants could still live in the conflict area, discussing this topic could be tense and emotional for these participants. It is understandable that the participants could be emotionally affected by

<sup>31</sup> The presence of other themes and concepts, which are not directly the topic or focus of this research, are examined in order to indicate supplementary and significant topics concerning conflict resolution and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. These potential results are shortly described in subheading 4.2.2 discussion and future research.

talking about this touching topic. Therefore it is extremely important that it is ensured that all participants are informed about the topics discussed in the interviews prior to their decision to participate in this research. As a researcher I was honest about the exact purpose of the research. Also, it is necessary that all participants in this research participate voluntarily; the participants remained free to refuse to answer any of the questions and were able to withdraw from the interview at any time, and could withdraw their data within two weeks of the interviews (Bryman, 2008). Consequently, beforehand I informed the participants of these options. Moreover, the privacy of the participants is assured at all times. Anonymity and confidentiality are of high importance and all participants of the interviews were able to decide whether or not to be mentioned by name or to be anonymous in this research and moreover whether or not to be quoted literally. In my opinion no ethical issues arose with the quantitative secondary data analysis and the qualitative discourse analysis.

## Chapter 3: Results

In this chapter the results of the three used methods are described. The first subheading of each method describes the results and in every last subheading the results are explained and further interpreted.

### 3.1 Qualitative content analysis

The results of the analyses are described following the themes and concepts<sup>32</sup> mentioned in subheading 2.2.1 qualitative content analysis.

#### 3.1.1 Thematic analysis OSCE documents

##### *Theme 1: Involvement*

The official documents of the OSCE mainly refer to the importance of the role of the Minsk-Group in assisting in the process of resolution. In all twelve documents the Co-Chairs of the Minsk-Group are referred to as mediators. For example in a document it is stated that the Minsk-Group.<sup>33</sup>

“Stand ready to witness the formal acceptance of these [Basic] Principles, to assist in the drafting of the peace agreement, and then to support its implementation with our international partners” (OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs, 2011a: 2).

Furthermore in seven documents statements about speeding up the peace process, resuming the negotiations and finding a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, emphasizes the influence of the OSCE. In three documents the importance of a prominent involvement of the OSCE in observing and monitoring the rules achieved in the ceasefire is accentuated. In all documents the belief is expressed that the Minsk-Group and its process “remains the most appropriate format for achieving a sustainable solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict”<sup>34</sup>.

The UN is only mentioned in one official document, in which the resolutions made by the SC and GA are recalled. Furthermore this document refers to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), as the principal judicial organ of the UN (ICJ, 2013) to resolve the conflict.

In nine documents of the OSCE the importance of involvement of the *directly involved actors* is underscored, of which eight refer to both Azerbaijan and Armenia. In a document it is urged, “the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan [should] reaffirm [...] their commitment to seek a final settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict”<sup>35</sup> and in another document “to bring a close [to] the current stage of negotiations”<sup>36</sup>. The authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh are mentioned in one document affirming the significance of a meeting between the Co-Chairs of the Minsk-Group and “the de facto Nagorno-Karabakh authorities”<sup>37</sup>.

---

<sup>32</sup> The themes and concepts in this subheading are italicized.

<sup>33</sup> All quotes, which consist of more than 30 words, are written out centred, and all the quotes, which consist of less than 30 words, are written out in the text itself.

<sup>34</sup> OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs, 1999: 47.

<sup>35</sup> OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs, 2011a: 1.

<sup>36</sup> OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs, 2007: 2.

<sup>37</sup> OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs, 2012: 2.

Only one document mentioned *another actor* as desired to be involved in resolving the conflict, i.e. the European Union (EU) by “establish[ing] mutual contact and interregional co-operation between the representatives of Armenia and Azerbaijan”<sup>38</sup>.

Overall the importance of involvements of particular actors is emphasised in all the analysed documents. Involvement of international organisations seems to be significant in a mediating way, while the individual directly involved actors should find a solution together in order to deal with different ideas about the interpretation of certain principles.

### *Theme 2: Principles*

The principle of *self-determination* is underlined in five documents as important international right of peoples. In one document it is described as:

“Independence and secession of a regional territory from a state may only be achieved through a lawful and peaceful process based on the democratic support of the inhabitants of such territory and not in the wake of an armed conflict leading to ethnic expulsion and the de facto annexation of such territory to another state” (PACE, 2005: 1).

In six documents there is directly or indirectly referred to the principle of *territorial integrity*. For example “all states [...] [should] refrain the continued occupation of territory”<sup>39</sup>.

Furthermore the territorial integrity of Armenia and Azerbaijan are underlined as important in the majority of the documents.

In eight documents the significance of guarantees for *security* is underscored. In four documents respecting the ceasefire agreement is stressed as well as the concern over “[...] violent incidents along the frontlines [...]”<sup>40</sup>. Moreover armed hostilities, military forces, weapons and munitions, and threats or using force against neighbours are rejected. In three documents the “guaranteed security for Nagorno-Karabakh and its whole population”<sup>41</sup> is urged.

In short, the principles of self-determination, territorial integrity and security are mentioned in the documents because of their important position during the process of conflict resolution. The responsibilities, which are of importance during this process, are mentioned in the next theme about accountability.

### *Theme 3: Accountability*

In eight documents promises or commitments are made in order to show the OSCE’s *engagement*. The OSCE promises in all these documents to assist in the “[...] drafting of a comprehensive settlement”<sup>42</sup> and “[...] create a better atmosphere for negotiations”<sup>43</sup>. Other ways, in which its commitment is expressed, is by encouraging “additional steps to strengthen the ceasefire and carry out confidence-building measures in all fields”<sup>44</sup> and supporting a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

---

<sup>38</sup> PACE, 2005: 2.

<sup>39</sup> PACE, 2005: 1.

<sup>40</sup> Presidents of the OSCE Minsk Group, 2012: 3.

<sup>41</sup> OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs, 1996: 15.

<sup>42</sup> OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs, 2010a: 4.

<sup>43</sup> OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs, 2010b: 2.

<sup>44</sup> OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs, 2010b: 3.

*Demands* are mentioned in nine official documents in order to resolve the conflict. For example calling for a “legal binding expression of will to finalize the status of Nagorno-Karabakh”<sup>45</sup> and requesting the parties to “pursue the matter through diplomatic steps, and refrain from politicizing the issue”<sup>46</sup>. In the majority of the documents there is called for a peaceful resolution without hatred and mistrust, with reconciliation and “[...] the willingness to seek an agreement bases on mutual understanding [...] and a shared vision of the benefits that peace will bring to all their peoples and to future generations”<sup>47</sup>.

Different *sources of law* are mentioned in order to refer to and stress the importance of certain other (official) documents and agreements. In all the documents the Basic Principles are mentioned, because the settlement of the conflict must be based upon these Principles. In some documents the Principles are repeated literally and in others it is only referred to the Helsinki Final Act. For example “we call upon the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to fulfil their commitment [...] reaching [an] agreement on the Basic Principles for a Settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”<sup>48</sup> and “we urge the leaders to be guided by the Principles of the Helsinki Final Act”<sup>49</sup>. Other sources of law like UN resolutions, the UN Charter and the Statute of the ICJ are cited as important in three documents<sup>50</sup>. One document refers to sources of law in a general way by mentioning, “a final settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict [...] [should be] based upon the principles and norms of international law”<sup>51</sup>.

In the documents different ways to take responsibility to resolve the conflict are mentioned. The proposed ways of implementing these ideas and resolving the conflict are described in the last theme about ways of resolution.

#### *Theme 4: Way of resolution*

In the majority of the documents different *humanitarian matters* are suggested, which should be kept in mind during the process of conflict resolution. All documents stresses the equal rights of peoples. In five documents attention is drawn to the importance of rights of displaced persons. For example “[...] the right of displaced persons from the area of conflict to return to their homes safely and with dignity”<sup>52</sup> is reaffirmed. Furthermore in a document ideas are proposed to “provide humanitarian aid and assistance [...]”<sup>53</sup> and “[...] to restore confidence [...] through schools, universities and the media.”<sup>54</sup>

Remarkably is the absence of taking positions on the exact *settlement* of Nagorno-Karabakh. Only in four documents the final status of the region is elaborated. In these documents suggestions are made, but they all underline the involvement of Azerbaijan and Armenia in deciding on the final settlement. In two documents a solution is mentioned by defining the status

<sup>45</sup> OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs, 2010a: 2.

<sup>46</sup> OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs, 2012: 2.

<sup>47</sup> Presidents of the OSCE Minsk Group, 2012: 2.

<sup>48</sup> Presidents of the OSCE Minsk Group, 2012: 2.

<sup>49</sup> Presidents of the OSCE Minsk Group, 2012: 1.

<sup>50</sup> One of these documents is the PACE resolution 1416. This document of the EU refers to all the resolutions of the UN on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It furthermore discusses the option to bring this case to the ICJ, by which article 36.1 of the ICJ Statute is mentioned as important. This article contains: “1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force” (ICJ, 2013).

<sup>51</sup> OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs, 2010a: 1.

<sup>52</sup> PACE, 2005: 3.

<sup>53</sup> PACE, 2005: 2.

<sup>54</sup> PACE, 2005: 1.

of Nagorno-Karabakh with “[...] the highest degree of self-rule within Azerbaijan”<sup>55</sup>. Additionally in one of these documents the “return of territories [...] to Azerbaijani control”<sup>56</sup> is suggested. In two other documents a possible solution to the conflict is described as “an intern status for Nagorno-Karabakh [in Azerbaijan] providing guarantees for security and self-governance”<sup>57</sup>. Although four documents carefully go into the discussion of the settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh, most of the documents do not pay attention to a concrete way of settlement.

Four documents directly refer to resolutions by force. However, *forcibility* in the peace process is rejected in all matters in all documents. For example it is explained, “the use of created the current situation of confrontation and instability”<sup>58</sup> and it is described, “they [the Co-chairs of the Minsk-Group] reject any treat or use of force”<sup>59</sup>. Furthermore, in three documents it is stated “the non-use of force”<sup>60</sup> and “withdrawing military forces from any occupied territories”<sup>61</sup> will resolve the conflict in a secure and peaceful way.

In seven documents the influence of *time* on the conflict is described indirectly. Most of these mentions refer to “the future of peace, stability and prosperity”<sup>62</sup> or “the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh”<sup>63</sup>. Furthermore one document alludes to the current peace process and its future implementation, while another document indicates “no progress has been achieved [...] to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict”<sup>64</sup>.

### 3.1.2 Thematic analysis UN documents

The ideas of resolution of the OSCE are enlarged with an analysis of the proposals of the UN to provide a broader overview of the thoughts of the international community within Track One Diplomacy.

#### *Theme 1: Involvement*

In all resolutions of the UN the importance of the involvement of the *OSCE* is emphasised. It is acknowledged that the “international mediation efforts of the Minsk-Group”<sup>65</sup> are essential in making progress in the peace process and in the implementation of resolutions. Furthermore the OSCE framework is considered as crucial to “assess the situation in the region”<sup>66</sup> and achieve “a negotiated settlement for the conflict”<sup>67</sup> in five documents.

The UN involvement is explained in all the documents as providing “assistance for the substantive negotiations [...] of the Minsk-Group”<sup>68</sup>. Three documents emphasise that all progresses of the Minsk-Group should be reported back to the SC. Moreover in four documents the Secretary-General or the United Nations Environment Programme is requested to provide expertise and assistance to overcome the short- and long-term humanitarian and environmental

---

<sup>55</sup> OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs, 1996: 15.

<sup>56</sup> OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs, 2009: 1.

<sup>57</sup> OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs, 2010b: 1.

<sup>58</sup> OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs, 2011a: 2.

<sup>59</sup> OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs, 2012: 2.

<sup>60</sup> Presidents of the OSCE Minsk Group, 2012: 2.

<sup>61</sup> PACE, 2005: 3.

<sup>62</sup> OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs, 2010a: 2.

<sup>63</sup> OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs, 2010a: 1.

<sup>64</sup> OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs, 1996: 15.

<sup>65</sup> UN General Assembly, 2008: 3.

<sup>66</sup> UN Security Council, 1993a: 1.

<sup>67</sup> UN Security Council, 1993c: 1.

<sup>68</sup> UN Security Council, 1993c: 1.

impacts on the region. Additionally it is decided in all SC resolutions that the UN remains “actively seized of the matter”<sup>69</sup> and will continue to simulate “future cooperation between the CSCE [nowadays OSCE] and the United Nations.”<sup>70</sup>

All the resolutions call upon the *directly involved actors* to be concerned to reach a solution to the conflict. In these documents the UN expresses it welcomes cooperation between Azerbaijan and Armenia. For example, “Urges the parties concerned immediately to resume negotiations for the resolution on the conflict [...]”<sup>71</sup> In two documents it is mentioned Armenia should “use its influence to achieve compliance by the Armenians of the Nagorno-Karabakh region”<sup>72</sup>.

*Other actors*, which are mentioned in five documents, are “relevant international agencies to provide urgent humanitarian assistance”<sup>73</sup>. Also in three documents “Member States of the UN, international and regional organisations and arrangements [...] are called upon to effectively contribute [...] to the process of settlement [...]”<sup>74</sup>. Additionally in one document explained:

“All States in the region [...] [should] refrain from [...] any interference or intervention which would lead to the widening of the conflict and undermine peace and security in the region” (UN Security Council, 1993d: 1).

In short, the UN documents stress the importance of the involvement of mostly the OSCE and more specifically the Minsk-Group. The UN emphasises in its proposals that all involved actors should cooperate. The theme about principles explains the issues in which the actors should find mutual understanding and collaboration.

## *Theme 2: Principles*

The principle of *self-determination* is mentioned in five documents. The UN reaffirms “continued respect and support for sovereignty [...] of Azerbaijan within its internationally recognized borders”<sup>75</sup> and reaffirms “the sovereignty of the Azerbaijani Republic and of all other States in the region.”<sup>76</sup> Self-determination is not specified, although the sovereignty of Azerbaijan is mentioned explicitly.

The principle of *territorial integrity* is also mentioned five documents, in which it is reaffirmed in the same way as self-determination. Moreover three documents emphasise the “inviolability of international borders”<sup>77</sup> and stress the unlawfulness of “[...] the situation resulting from the occupation of the territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan [...]”<sup>78</sup> Besides two of the resolutions are named “the situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.”<sup>79</sup>

The safety and *security* in the region is an important concept mentioned in every document. Furthermore the resolutions made before the ceasefire emphasise the importance “to

---

<sup>69</sup> UN Security Council, 1993d: 1; UN Security Council, 1993c: 1.

<sup>70</sup> UN Security Council, 1993d: 1; UN Security Council, 1993c: 1.

<sup>71</sup> UN Security Council, 1993a: 1.

<sup>72</sup> UN Security Council, 1993b: 1.

<sup>73</sup> UN Security Council, 1993d: 1; UN Security Council, 1993b: 1; UN Security Council, 1993c: 1.

<sup>74</sup> UN General Assembly, 2008: 3.

<sup>75</sup> UN General Assembly, 2008: 3.

<sup>76</sup> UN Security Council, 1993b: 1; UN Security Council, 1993c: 1; UN Security Council, 1993d: 1.

<sup>77</sup> UN Security Council, 1993b: 1; UN Security Council, 1993c: 1; UN Security Council, 1993d: 1.

<sup>78</sup> UN General Assembly, 2008: 3.

<sup>79</sup> UN General Assembly, 2006: 1; UN General Assembly, 2008: 1.

reach and maintain durable ceasefire arrangements”<sup>80</sup>. In the other documents it is underscored that the ceasefire should be maintained and also condemned “violations of the ceasefire.”<sup>81</sup> Moreover attention is given to condemn “all hostile actions [...] in particular attacks on civilians and bombardments of inhabited areas.”<sup>82</sup>

Besides the principles it is interesting to analyse what kind of accountabilities are needed to find a resolution by cooperation and involvement of different actors involved.

### *Theme 3: Accountability*

In all documents promises or commitments are made in order to show the *engagement* of the UN. For example by “reaffirming its full support for the peace process [...]”<sup>83</sup>. Additionally in two documents “restoration of economic, transport and energy links in the region”<sup>84</sup> are supported.

Different *demands* are expressed in the documents in order to recognise and stress concerns. All the documents stress the concern of the continuation of the conflict and request the parties to withdraw from using force and endanger peace and security. In one document it is expressed as “the necessity of providing normal, secure and equal conditions of life for Armenian and Azerbaijani communities in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan.”<sup>85</sup> In four documents it is called on contribution of all parties “to refrain from all violations of international humanitarian law”<sup>86</sup> and in three documents an “immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Armenian forces from all the occupied territories of [...] Azerbaijan”<sup>87</sup> is demanded.

In order to enforce the accountabilities, different *sources* are mentioned. All documents recall and reaffirm other UN resolutions made on resolving the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore the rules of international customary law as well as the reports of the OSCE are mentioned as being considered or welcomed. More specifically the principles of humanitarian law are described in four documents as important to commit to. Besides these sources of law, the UN Charter forms the basis of all UN resolutions as these are “guided by the purposes, principles and provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.”<sup>88</sup>

In order to provide an overview of the ways the abovementioned responsibilities can be implemented, the proposed ideas of ways resolution are described in the next theme.

### *Theme 4: Way of resolution*

In the majority of the documents attention is mainly given to *humanitarian matters*. In three documents the Secretary-General is requested to “provide urgent humanitarian assistance to affected civilian population and to assist refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in security and dignity.”<sup>89</sup> Furthermore the displacement of civilians and the situations of humanitarian emergency are mentioned as concerns that need to be dealt with. Also the

---

<sup>80</sup> UN Security Council, 1993b: 1; UN Security Council, 1993d: 1.

<sup>81</sup> UN Security Council, 1993d: 1.

<sup>82</sup> UN Security Council, 1993b: 1; UN Security Council, 1993d: 1.

<sup>83</sup> UN Security Council, 1993c: 1; UN Security Council, 1993d: 1.

<sup>84</sup> UN Security Council, 1993b: 1.

<sup>85</sup> UN General Assembly, 2008: 2.

<sup>86</sup> UN Security Council, 1993b: 1.

<sup>87</sup> UN Security Council, 1993b: 1; UN General Assembly, 2008: 2.

<sup>88</sup> UN General Assembly, 2008: 3.

<sup>89</sup> UN Security Council, 1993c: 1.



hostilities and the suffering of the population are underscored in five documents. Remarkably are the requests to the Secretary-General to cope with all these issues and provide humanitarian assistance.

UN positions on the exact *settlement* of Nagorno-Karabakh are not described in the documents. In only one document a form of settlement is expressed by recognition of the necessity of equal conditions of life in Nagorno-Karabakh and hence allowing “an effective democratic system of self-governance to be built up in this region within [...] Azerbaijan”<sup>90</sup>.

In five documents *forcibility* in the resolution of the conflict is rejected. In four of these documents “[...] the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory”<sup>91</sup> is reaffirmed. Moreover the “excesses in the use of force”<sup>92</sup> are noted with alarm and extensions of military campaigns are labelled as unacceptable. The treat or use of force is rejected in all documents.

The influence of *time* on the conflict is explained in four documents by welcoming a “timetable of urgent steps to implement [...] resolutions”<sup>93</sup> or a timetable for the deployment of the ceasefire monitor mission of the OSCE. Additionally these documents accentuate the importance of immediate cessation of violation and resumption of the negotiations for a resolution.

### 3.1.3 Résumé

This résumé explains the ideas of conflict resolution that have been proposed by the OSCE and the UN in official documents for settling the territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh<sup>94</sup>. The majority of the OSCE documents refers to the Minsk-Group as important mediator in finding a solution to the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh. The UN emphasises the importance of the OSCE and more specifically also the Minsk-Group in all its documents. Furthermore the UN identifies itself, among others, as an important organisation, which commits itself to assist in creating substantive negotiations by cooperating with the OSCE in which humanitarian matters are of high importance.

It could be argued that both the UN and the OSCE acknowledge the importance of involvement of the Minsk-Group in resolving the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. As international mediator the Minsk-Group should stimulate the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, however these two directly involved actors should eventually come to a solution together. Progress in the process of resolving the conflict is possible when the states of Armenia and Azerbaijan cooperate and commit themselves during a peaceful negotiation to a final settlement over Nagorno-Karabakh. Most UN documents describe that Armenia and Azerbaijan should find a solution to the conflict as soon as possible and the involvement of Azerbaijan and Armenia in the peace process is highlighted in the documents. In its documents the OSCE focuses merely on the process and the way the negotiations should occur, while the focus of the UN lies merely on taking the responsibility to ensure the safety and security of the population involved in the

---

<sup>90</sup> UN General Assembly, 2008: 2.

<sup>91</sup> UN Security Council, 1993a: 1; UN Security Council, 1993c: 1; UN Security Council, 1993d: 1.

<sup>92</sup> UN Security Council, 1993d: 1.

<sup>93</sup> UN Security Council, 1993b: 1; UN Security Council, 1993c: 1; UN Security Council, 1993d: 1.

<sup>94</sup> This subheading answers the research sub-question: What are the ideas of conflict resolution that have been proposed by the OSCE and the UN in official resolutions for settling the territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh?

conflict. In short, the UN engages itself to be involved in resolving and overcoming humanitarian matters and situations, which endanger the peace and security of the region, while the OSCE promises to encourage the peace process and resolution in general. Additionally the OSCE and UN both reject the threat or use of force in order to avoid a situation of confrontation and instability in the region<sup>95</sup>.

The principles of self-determination and territorial integrity are mentioned in almost all UN and OSCE documents as important principles of law. Both organisations stress the importance that all actors should respect these principles in finding a solution. To the most extent the OSCE expressed its responsibility to encouraging peaceful negotiations, following the Basic Principles and customary international law. Additionally the UN underlines action is required in accordance with the UN Charter and other sources of international law. Furthermore according to both organisations the ceasefire agreement is important and must be respected at any time.

The analysis of the documents indicates that the OSCE and UN share mutual ideas of the process of resolving the conflict. Although both organisations stimulate negotiations within Track One Diplomacy, they neither impose sanctions or binding decisions on one of the involved actors nor they express themselves about the concrete and final settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh. In order to explore the cohesion between the formal ideas of the OSCE and UN and the local ideas, the following subheadings analyse the thoughts and conceptualisations of Armenians.

### 3.2 Quantitative secondary data-analysis

#### *3.2.1 Statistical tests*

##### *3.2.1.1 Descriptive statistics*

The results of the quantitative analysis of the CB 2011 structured interviews are listed and described in this subheading. In 3.2.2 Résumé an explanation of the meaning of the below described results will be given in order to provide a bright and clear overview. In table four the descriptive statistics of the variables used in these analyses are shown.

Table 4: Descriptive statistics

	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Mode</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Maximum</b>
<b>Dependent variable</b>							
Involvement: Russia	2065	2.75	3	.563	.012	1	3
Involvement: United States	1962	2.13	3	.855	.019	1	3
Involvement: France	1964	2.39	3	.803	.018	1	3
Involvement: Turkey	2008	1.27	1	.608	.014	1	3
Involvement: European Union	1907	2.33	3	.793	.018	1	3
Involvement: OSCE <sup>96</sup>	1820	2.3902	3	.60748	.01424	1	3
Prospects NK integral part AR	1640	2.35	3	.684	.017	1	3
NK: Formal part in AR	2154	2.52	3	.733	.016	1	3
NK: Independent	2130	2.45	3	.759	.016	1	3

<sup>95</sup> This rejection is mentioned in the UN Charter Article 2.4: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” (United Nations, 2006: 6).

<sup>96</sup> This variable is created based on the PCA, of which the results are described later in this subheading.

NK: Special Administration	1941	1.09	1	.337	.008	1	3
NK: Autonomy in AZ	1926	1.08	1	.354	.008	1	3
NK: Formal part in AZ	1903	1.13	1	.456	.010	1	3
Trust in UN	1860	3.18	3	1.195	.028	1	5
Trust in EU	1889	3.20	3	1.207	.028	1	5
Timeframe Resolution	1438	5.16	7	2.020	.053	1	7
Gender (1 = male)	2365	1.55	2	.498	.010	1	2
Age	2365	48.5281	50.00	.36721	17.8577	18.00	92.00
Stratum	2365	1.9074	1	.82185	.01690	1	3
Religion	2216	1.14	1	.976	17.8577	1	10
<b>Independent variable</b>							
Solution by peaceful neg.	1937	3.09	4	1.050	.024	1	4
Solution by force	1753	1.91	1	1.063	.025	1	4

609 (25.8%) respondents said the US should not be involved at all in finding a solution for the conflict, though 497 (21.0%) believed the US should be less involved and the majority of 856 (36.2%) thought this state should be more involved. The answers about the involvement of Russia and France are less divided. 1693 (71.6%) respondents thought Russia should be more involved, the other 672 (28.4%) believed Russia should be less involved, not involved at all or did not know an answer to this question. Additionally 1964 (83.0%) persons believed France should be more involved, while the other 401 respondents (17.0%) gave a different answer. According to 1650 (69.8%) respondents Turkey should not be involved, while 183 (7.7%) believed this state should be less involved and 175 (7.4%) said Turkey should be more involved. Lastly, 389 (16.4%) respondents thought the EU should not be involved at all in finding a solution, 504 (21.3%) believed the EU should be less involved and the majority of 1014 (42.9%) said the EU should be more involved. The answer option 'don't know' was filled in varying from 14.1% to 18.3%. 840 respondents (35.5%) had trust in the EU; whereas 436 (18.4%) distrust the EU and 613 (25.9%) respondents are neutral. 806 (34.1%) respondents expressed trust in the UN, it was distrusted by 427 (18.0%), and 627 (26.5%) respondents stayed neutral.

The question about the period it will take to resolve the conflict is answered diffusive. 550 (23.3%) respondents believed the conflict will never be resolved, 291 (12.3%) thought it would take more than ten years, 413 (17.5%) thought in two to ten years, only 76 (3.2%) thought the conflict would be resolved within the next year. 108 (4.6%) believed the conflict has already been resolved. Remarkably 909 (38.4%) did not know an answer to this question.

Questions were asked about settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. According to 196 (8.3%) respondents since the ceasefire agreement in May 1994 the prospects of Nagorno-Karabakh for becoming an integral part of Armenia decreased, 670 (28.3%) respondents believed the prospects stayed the same and the majority of 774 (32.7%) thought it increased since May 1994. Noteworthy 643 (27.2%) gave 'don't know' as an answer.

Different ideas have been proposed for the settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh. According to 1424 (60.2%) respondents definitely favour the option of Nagorno-Karabakh as formal part of Armenia, although 310 (13.1%) never accept this option. 1309 (55.3%) favour the option of an independent country and 349 (14.8%) would never accept that. 43 (1.4%) choose the option of

an administrative region jointly governed by Armenia and Azerbaijan, while 1809 (76.5%) would never accept this settlement. 48 (2.0%) thought Nagorno-Karabakh with a high degree of autonomy within Azerbaijan as an option, however 1816 (76.8%) never accept a high degree solution. Lastly, 92 (3.9%) respondents favour Nagorno-Karabakh becoming a formal part of Azerbaijan without autonomy, and 1753 (74.1%) would never accept this option. Under certain circumstances 420 (17.8%) respondents are willing to accept Nagorno-Karabakh as formal part of Armenia, 472 (20.0%) would accept it as an independent country, and there is unwillingness for the other options (varying from 2.6% to 4.1%).

On the one hand 1471 (62,2%) respondents believe it is rather likely or very likely a solution to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh will be found within five years by peaceful negotiations. On the other hand 460 (19,5%) believe the solution will be found by force, although 1293 (54,7%) believe this is rather or very unlikely. 24.4% did not no an answer by force and 16.9% by peaceful negotiations.

### *3.2.1.2 Explanatory statistics*

A Pearson's  $r$  test is carried out to see whether or not a correlation exists between opinions of how likely it is to find a solution by peaceful negotiation and a solution by force. All assumptions for the t-test as parametric tests are met<sup>97</sup>. The analysis shows that there is a significant negative correlation between a solution by peaceful negotiation and a solution by force  $r = -.468$ ,  $p = .000$  ( $N = 1727$ ). Furthermore a dependent t-test is carried out in order to compare the means of a solution by peaceful negotiation ( $M = 3.07$ ;  $SE = .026$ ) and a solution by force ( $M = 1.89$ ;  $SE = .025$ ). The t-test indicated that there is a significant difference between the means of these variables  $t(1726) = 26.892$ ;  $p = .000$ . Because there is a significant difference it is justified to combine and thereafter transform these variables in the dichotomous variable 'peaceforce'.

Questions were asked about the desirable involvement of several countries or organisations in finding a solution for the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. It is interesting to investigate whether or not a relation exists between the different desirable involvements. A Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was conducted on the 5 items<sup>98</sup> concerning the involvement with an orthogonal rotation (varimax). To verify the sampling adequacy the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure is checked,  $KMO = .779$  which is good according to Field (2009). Furthermore all the individual items were  $>.731$ , which is also above the .5 limit mentioned by Field. The Barlett's test of sphericity is  $\chi^2(10) = 2469.235$ ;  $p = .001$ , which indicates that "correlations between items were sufficiently large for PCA" (Field, 2009: 671). The PCA is carried out with a fixed number of 2 factors<sup>99</sup>. The analysis shows that the two factors together explain 70,8% of the variance in the data. Turkey is one component and Russia, the United States, France and the European Union are one factor. It could be suggested that the items that

<sup>97</sup> Some of the question only have three answer options and therefore are not necessarily measured on internal level.

Homogeneity of variance is not violated because the sample sizes are equal. It could be assumed that the data is normally distributed, because the sample size is 1726 respondents, which is greater than 30.

<sup>98</sup> The states of France, Russia, the United States, Turkey and the European Union.

<sup>99</sup> The use of a fixed number of factors could be justified from the theory explained in subheading 1.1.3. Turkey could be one component and Russia, the United States, France and the European Union could be clustered in one factor as well, because the latter are the countries, which are highly involved as mediators in the process of resolving the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh within the Minsk-Group of the OSCE (OSCE, 2013). Furthermore, a fixed number of 2 factors is justified from the statistics because there are almost 2 eigenvalues over 1, respectively 2.607 and .932 when conducting the PCA without a fixed number of factors.

cluster on the same component represent the OSCE Minsk-Group on the one hand and Turkey as separate component on the other hand.

An interesting analysis is about the involvement of the Minsk-Group. 25.5% of the respondents believed the Minsk-Group should be more involved in finding a solution for the conflict, only 8.8% believed it should be less involved, and 4.2% thought it should be not involved at all. Remarkably 23.0% are missing values, which could be declared because many respondents gave 'don't know' as an answer and this option is included in the missing values. This could indicate that respondents believed the Minsk-Group should be an important actor, while almost the same amount of respondents considered not being able to decide whether or not the Minsk-Group should be involved. It could suggest that the role of the Minsk-Group in resolving the conflict is ambiguous

Based on the outcomes of the dependent t-test and the PCA, a logistic regression was conducted to predict which solution is desired, using peaceforce as outcome variable ( $M = 1.79$ ;  $SE = .406$ ). Gender, age and stratum were used as predictors in model one, Trust in UN and Trust in EU were added in model two, and involvement Turkey and involvement OSCE<sup>100</sup> were added in model three<sup>101</sup>. The assumptions of logistic regression are met. Due to the PCA multicollinearity between the predictors is not a problem. 826 (79.1%) of the respondents prefer a solution by peaceful negotiation while 212 (20.9%) respondents prefer force.

In model one a test of the full model against a constant only model is significant ( $\chi^2(3) = 13.009$ ,  $p = .004$  and Nagelkerke's  $R^2 = .020$ ), which indicates the predictors gender, age and stratum as reliable distinguishers between supporters of a solution by peaceful negotiation and by force. The Wald statistics show only age made a significant contribution Wald (1) = 10.181,  $p = .001$ . The odds ratio (OR) is  $\text{Exp}(B) = 1.015$ . Gender and stratum are not significant predictors<sup>102</sup>. Adding Trust in the UN and the EU in model two, the full model still contributes significantly to the prediction of peaceforce ( $\chi^2(5) = 38.624$ ,  $p = .000$  and Nagelkerke's  $R^2 = .057$ ). The Wald statistics show that age is significant ( $p = .000$ ) and the other predictors are not<sup>103</sup>. The OR is  $\text{Exp}(B) = 1.017$ . Adding the involvement of Turkey and of the OSCE in model three, the full model still contributes significantly to the prediction of peaceforce  $\chi^2(7) = 39.417$ ,  $p = .000$ , Nagelkerke's  $R^2 = .059$ . The Wald statistics show again that age is significant (Wald (1) = 12.240,  $p = .000$ ,  $\text{Exp}(B) = 1.017$ ) and the other predictors are not<sup>104</sup>. Adding the involvement of Turkey and of the US, Russia, France and the EU separately in model three, the full model is also significant  $\chi^2(10) = 51.465$ ,  $p = .000$ , Nagelkerke's  $R^2 = .076$ . The Wald statistics show that not only age is significant (Wald (1) = 12.175,  $p = .000$ ,  $\text{Exp}(B) = 1.017$ ) but also the involvement of Russia (Wald (1) = 12.175,  $p = .000$ ,  $\text{Exp}(B) = 1.578$ ). The other predictors do not significantly contribute in predicting peaceforce<sup>105</sup>.

---

<sup>100</sup> Clustered in one factor with the PCA.

<sup>101</sup> Religion is not added in the logistic regression; because 2156 (97.3%) respondents are adherents of the Armenian Apostolic Church meaning almost all Armenians share the same religion. Therefore the variety is, in my opinion too little to put into an analysis.

<sup>102</sup> Stratum:  $p = .172$ , gender:  $p = .974$ .

<sup>103</sup> Stratum:  $p = .360$ , gender:  $p = .797$ , trust in EU:  $p = .144$ , trust in UN:  $p = .247$ .

<sup>104</sup> Stratum:  $p = .358$ , gender:  $p = .802$ , trust in EU:  $p = .174$ , trust in UN:  $p = .237$ , involvement OSCE:  $p = .289$ , involvement Turkey:  $p = .580$ .

<sup>105</sup> Stratum:  $p = .451$ , gender:  $p = .980$ , trust in EU:  $p = .175$ , trust in UN:  $p = .196$ , involvement US:  $p = .161$ , involvement France:  $p = .189$ , involvement EU:  $p = .168$ , involvement Turkey:  $p = .580$ .

### 3.2.2 *Résumé*

The quantitative statistics are conducted in order to investigate the ideas of conflict resolution of Armenians for settling the territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and to test the hypotheses, mentioned in the Introduction - Research Questions<sup>106</sup>. Summarising the foregoing descriptive and explanatory data-analysis, various remarks could be described.

The majority of the questioned Armenians favour Nagorno-Karabakh to become a formal part of Armenia or become an independent state. The ideas of settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh vary from 60.2% of the respondents who definitely favour Nagorno-Karabakh to become a formal part of Armenia, to only 1.4% of the respondents who prefer the option of Nagorno-Karabakh as an administrative region jointly governed by Armenia and Azerbaijan. Additionally most of these Armenians would never accept a solution in which Nagorno-Karabakh would become an administrative region jointly governed by Armenia and Azerbaijan nor get a high degree of autonomy within Azerbaijan nor become a formal part of Azerbaijan without autonomy.

The results show that more Armenians prefer a solution by peaceful negotiation (79.1%) than a solution by force (20.9%). There is a significant negative correlation between the two ways of solution, meaning that the more Armenians believe a solution is more likely to be found by peaceful negotiation the less they believe a solution should be found by force. Moreover on average, Armenians considered a solution by peaceful negotiation of the conflict significantly more likely than by force. Therefore hypothesis one<sup>107</sup> could be accepted. 62,2% of the respondents believed it is likely a solution would be found within five years by peaceful negotiations. And 19,5% said the solution would be found by force within this timeframe. Remarkably, the results indicate that although the majority of the questioned Armenians believe it is likely a solution to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh will be found by peaceful negotiations within the next five years, most of these Armenians also believe the conflict will never be resolved; neither by force nor by peaceful negotiations.

The descriptive statistics show the respondents believed different states should be involved in finding a solution to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Most of the respondents trust the UN and the EU as international organisations<sup>108</sup>. The majority of the Armenian respondents believe the US, Russia, the EU and France should be more involved in the conflict. Hypothesis two<sup>109</sup> is therefore not rejected. It is shown by the PCA that on the one hand the states of France, Russia, the United States, and the European Union cluster as one factor, while on the other Turkey forms a separate factor. It could be proposed that the items of the former factor represent the OSCE Minsk-Group. Correspondingly, more than a quarter of the questioned Armenians believe the OSCE should be more involved. Conversely, most Armenians believe Turkey should not be involved in finding a resolution to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The explanatory data-analysis show that gender, age and stratum, which form model one in the logistic regression, contribute significantly to the prediction. The Wald statistic shows that only age is a significant predictor and because the odds ratio (OR) is greater than 1 it shows age

---

<sup>106</sup> This subheading partly answers the research sub-question: What are the ideas of Armenians for settling the territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh?

<sup>107</sup> Armenians prefer a solution by peaceful negotiations to a solution by force.

<sup>108</sup> The question about trust is asked separately from the questions about Nagorno-Karabakh, therefore no connection is made between trusting the UN and the EU, and the desired involvement of these actors in resolving the conflict.

<sup>109</sup> France, the European Union (EU), Russia and the United States could be clustered as a group of interrelated variables.

increases the odds of supporting a solution by peaceful negotiation. A small majority has trust in the UN, which also applies to the trust in the EU. Striking is the fact that adding the predictors Trust in UN and Trust in EU to model one, still age is the only significant predictor. Adding the involvement of OSCE and the involvement of Turkey as predictors the contribution is still significant and age is still the only individual significant predictor. However, the odds supporting a solution by peaceful negotiation are only 1.015 or 1.017 more likely. The positive Nagelkerke's values of age in all models prove that when the predictor variable increases, the likelihood of the outcome variable also increases. Indicating the older an Armenian is, the greater the odds of supporting a peaceful solution. Noticeable is the observation when adding France, the EU, Russia and the US separately instead of as the OSCE, not only age but also Russia significantly predict whether or not Armenians are more likely to support a solution by peaceful negotiation than by force. The more Armenians want Russia to be involved, the greater the odds of supporting a peaceful solution of the conflict. The OR shows the odds to support a solution by peaceful negotiation increase to 1.578 when Russia is significant. Hypothesis three<sup>110</sup> should therefore be rejected. From the results of the logistic regression it could be argued that only age is a significant predictor in forecasting whether Armenians prefer a solution by peaceful as well as Russia. In short, the regression demonstrates when testing the full models against the constant only models, all full models are significant. The regression shows that in all three models age is a significant predictor for peaceforce as outcome variable, with odds ratios above 1. The involvement of the OSCE as predictor is not significant, but when putting the items of this factor separately into the model, Russia appears highly significant as well.

The results could indicate cohesion between the ideas of the OSCE and UN and the thoughts of the surveyed Armenians, because these Armenians favour a solution by peaceful negotiations over a solution by force with involvement of the Minsk-Group. The most desired solutions are Nagorno-Karabakh becoming a formal part of Armenia or becoming independent, which could suggest there is no overall cohesion between the different ideas because ideas within Track One Diplomacy do not elaborate on a concrete settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh. The analysis of the qualitative in-depth interviews will clarify the cohesion between the ideas.

### 3.3 Qualitative in-depth interviews

#### 3.3.1 *Thematic analysis of interviews*

The results of the analyses are described with the themes and concepts<sup>111</sup> mentioned in subheading 2.2.3 qualitative in-depth interviews as guideline.

#### *Theme 1: Involvement*

The majority of the participants believe *international organisations* should be involved in solving the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. For example, "The ultimate solution would be if an international organisation would settle the dispute."<sup>112</sup> The UN and OSCE are mentioned as important international organisations. Although eight respondents said that these organisations could not solve the conflict themselves, their role is to assist the direct involved actors<sup>113</sup> in

<sup>110</sup> Gender, age, stratum, trust in the UN, trust in the EU and the involvement of France, the European Union (EU), Russia, the United States and Turkey could predict whether Armenians support a solution by peaceful negotiation or by force.

<sup>111</sup> The themes and concepts in this subheading are italicized.

<sup>112</sup> All quotes for participants are translated from Dutch into English, because all interviews except one were held in Dutch.

<sup>113</sup> The governments of Armenia, Azerbaijan and the authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh.

finding a solution by mediating and organising negotiations. Most participants acknowledge the UN could assist in implementing a resolution, and it is explained this is because they are not able to enforce their own resolutions made by the GA or SC. A participant, who recently travelled to the region to visit relatives and saw the actual situation on the ground describes: “They [the UN] are able to do something, but [...] recently not much is solved by them, [...] because they do not have great influence.”<sup>114</sup> The Armenian Ambassador explains:

“The UN itself is not a negotiating body, the UN can be a body that can follow up on the process, how it is proceeding, encouraging the states to keep on working on a peaceful resolution. [...]. It is impossible that an UN resolution would resolve the conflict [...].”

According to almost all participants the OSCE should be more involved as mediator during the negotiations. One young participant, who grew up in Armenia after the intense violations had stopped says, “Officially [...] [the OSCE] plays a role, but unofficial [...] little attention is drawn to their rules in practice”, however another older one says, “the OSCE has a preventive role, which is to the most extent an effective mediation role.” Most participants mention the Minsk-Group as a group, which intermediates in order to create a forum allowing Armenia and Azerbaijan to resolve the conflict. In addition the Ambassador says the Minsk-Group is “the best and the most efficient and effective format, because [...] the three major players in the region and also in the world, are the negotiating mediators”.

The majority of the participants believe the way of involvement of *Azerbaijan* needs to change in order to find a resolution to the conflict. For example “They want to provoke every time [...] they should accept there is not only territorial integrity but also the right to self-determination” and “Essentially Azerbaijan should accept that the piece of land does not belong to them.” According to half of the participants Azerbaijan needs to give in and “they should be willing to talk about and discuss the conflict in order to find a solution, which also applies to Armenia”. Moreover the same participants mentioned the authoritative regime of Azerbaijan hinder the peace talks.

According to a small majority of the participants *Armenia* should support and help Nagorno-Karabakh to become independent because as one participant who is strongly engaged to the Dutch Armenian Diaspora describes: “In 1991 they [Nagorno-Karabakh] decided to be [...] independent and because they belong to the same nation as people in Armenia” or because “we are neighbours and perhaps even brothers.” A minority believes Armenia should show more power during the peace process and a small number emphasises Armenia should not give in despite the violent treats of Azerbaijan. All participants, except one believe *Armenia* should play a prominent role in finding a solution to the conflict. The majority believes so because Armenia represents Nagorno-Karabakh during the negotiations. The participant who does not believe in the rightness of the involvement of Armenia believes a state is not able to represent another state and therefore “Nagorno-Karabakh should represent itself in the negotiations”. This participant was born in Armenia, but before moving to the Netherlands, after only a few years he already moved to and therefore was raised in Russia.

---

<sup>114</sup> All quotes, which consist of more than 30 words, are written out centered, and all the quotes, which consist of less than 30 words, are written out in the text itself.



The importance of the involvement of the authorities of *Nagorno-Karabakh* in finding a solution to the conflict is emphasised by most participants. For example a participant who lived in Armenia during the violent late 1980s:

“Nagorno-Karabakh has the leading role in the conflict. They should stand up for their rights and [...] speak out. [...] Their role is not to give up for their position.”

A few participants, who all moved to the Netherlands during their childhood, mention explicitly that Nagorno-Karabakh should become an official actor within the negotiations.

All participants mention *other actors* as important players in solving the conflict. All participants described the importance of the role of Russia as “Russia tries to mediate” and a participant even says:

“Russia plays the most important role in resolving the conflict, [...] because the Caucasus is an important strategic region. [...] And Russia does not want to loose territory or allies to the US.”

Also Turkey and the European Union are mentioned several times as important actors, because their interests should be taken into account when trying to solve the conflict. The Armenian Diaspora is according to the majority able to support Nagorno-Karabakh in their way to become independent. Most participants mention the US as actor, which should be involved because “they do not want to have instability in the region”. The theme about principles elaborates on the issues the involved actors should take into account while resolving the conflict.

### *Theme 2: Principles*

A majority of the participants directly mention the principle of *self-determination* as important right of peoples. Most of them mentioned this principle by itself in their description of the history of the conflict. One participant, who annually travels to Armenia describes, “Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh want the right to self-determination or desire to bring together Armenia and Karabakh” and clarifies this by mentioning the shared “culture, religion, traditions and language.” Another participant says the conflict “is about rights of self-determination of peoples, [...] to give them [the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh] the right to decide on the future” and another one explains, “[...] The opinion of the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh must be respected and accepted.” Also the Ambassador agrees on this by saying, “The most important thing is [...] that the will and the wishes of the Nagorno-Karabakh people will be followed. And the security of these people should be guaranteed.”

All participants acknowledge the importance of the *ceasefire* agreement and the majority believes the ceasefire prevented a war from occurring again and stopped the violence. Moreover a few participants believe the agreement was a logical step because of the warfare and fighting’s. Four participants emphasise the negotiations before the agreement. For example, “The ceasefire agreement is signed after constructive negotiations, which is positive.” However the majority describes the war is not yet over and all participants mention by itself violations of the ceasefire. One older participant, who already lives more than 30 years in the Netherlands but still has

contacts in Armenia explains, “Incidents happen quite often and still a lot of people die”. Although there is a ceasefire, no peace agreement is signed yet and according to one participant therefore “the border is not completely ‘fireproof’”.

Several participants mention *sources* of law or other obligations and responsibilities, which should be taken into account when resolving the conflict. The Ambassador says the official documents of the OSCE are:

“The guiding framework [...] made by the co-chairs of the Minsk-Group and all the parties agreed upon this framework, which has to be followed for that stage of negotiations. [...] They are the rules of the game.”

A participant mentions the four resolutions of the SC and explains that despite their binding force no solution is achieved. Additionally another one, who is a law student explains, “every conflict should be resolved within the legal field” and “besides treaties, international law also relies on cases and custom [...] like the right to self-determination”. Moreover the criteria of the Montevideo Convention to become a state are described, because according to this participant “Nagorno-Karabakh has everything to become independent [...] within the legal field. The Ambassador explains the importance of taking into account the Basic Principles. A faithful participant emphasise a solution needs to and can only be found with “patience, hope and love.”

Some participants believe *time* has a negative influence on the conflict, because for example “time does not heal anything [...] and the people involved in the conflict will not know what is going on [...] except hating one nation, their neighbour.” Additionally it is described, “the hatred must end and only then you are able to achieve rapprochement.” While others thought time has a positive effective for Armenia. A participant explains, “Armenia is able to prepare itself better then”, while another participant explained, “the awareness of the international community will grow and eventually they will recognise Nagorno-Karabakh.” The Ambassador believes, “Time is working to nobody’s advantage, because the possibilities of developments and bringing back the country into normalcy is not moving at the speed it could. [...] Everybody is losing.” A few participants believe the conflict would end as soon as the international community recognises the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh, while other younger participants believe, “time heals all wounds” and “time will heal the conflict, the only question is how long this will take.” A participant believes, “If the conflict will not be solved by force, it could continue many years” and additionally another participant “[...] I believe that both sides [Azerbaijan and Armenia] must change drastically, otherwise it will take a very long time before the conflict is resolved.” The principles, which should be taken into account, give direction to the preferable way of resolution.

### *Theme 3: Way of resolution*

All participants express their ideas of a concrete *settlement* of Nagorno-Karabakh. The majority of the respondents believe Nagorno-Karabakh should become or stay independent. For example, “Nagorno-Karabakh should determine itself what it wants, if they decide they want to be independent then they should become independent [...]” and “Nagorno-Karabakh should become independent or should become part of Armenia, both options are the same in practice.” Also the Ambassador says, “We recognize the independence of Karabakh.” It is interesting to notice that

the participants of the younger generation more often believe Nagorno-Karabakh should become independent, while the older generation mentions the region is already independent. It could be explained by the differences in experience while living in Armenia. Most participants, who lived in Armenia during the violent clashes as adults, mention a success of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh in winning the fights and becoming independent. Several participants, who did not experience conflict or were not aware of the violence emphasise Nagorno-Karabakh is not yet independent and should be recognised. No participant believes the opinions of Nagorno-Karabakh with a high degree of autonomy within Azerbaijan; Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan without autonomy or Nagorno-Karabakh jointly governed by Azerbaijan and Armenian could be a solution to the conflict.

Almost all participants believe the conflict should be resolved by *peaceful negotiations*. The Ambassador emphasises, “The solution should be found only by peaceful negotiations. Even if it takes 50 years to do that, it should only be solved by peaceful negotiations.” Although the majority of the participants prefers peaceful negotiations, they are also very sceptical, “I can only hope that it will end peacefully”, another participant, who lived in Armenia before the ceasefire says, “The probability to find a solution by ‘peaceful’ negotiations is really little” and additionally declares, “Officially they constructively try to find a solution by peaceful negotiations [...], however not much happened the past years.” The importance of peaceful negotiations is expressed in different ways. For example, “negotiating means giving and taking. They should try to create win-win situations in order to resolve the conflict”, “If you are negotiating with each other, there is a possibility for a resolution” and “solution-oriented thinking is possible during the negotiations. A participant says that peaceful negotiations should be carried out step by step in order to be able to succeed in the process of giving and taking. Most participants explain that successful peaceful negotiations are difficult to achieve because many actors are involved, “when there are only two parties involved, it will be easier to resolve the conflict in a peaceful manner.” Furthermore it is described, “[...] because of the balancing of supporting different interests of the US and Russia, more countries started to be involved.” In addition the Ambassador also explains, “the international community can be helpful if they stop this balancing act between Armenia and Azerbaijan whenever there is a ceasefire violation.”

All participants believe a solution by *force* is not preferable, but unfortunately more likely than a solution by negotiations. For example, “nothing could be achieved by force” and it is “impossible to solve it by force. It already started with force, which shows [...] people will die and this is not a solution.” Furthermore the majority explains a solution by force is always temporary. For example:

“Indirect pressure could solve the conflict, because by force something could be solved in the short-term, but if you want to solve the conflict in the long-term you need peace and internal tranquillity.”

One participant describes, “A war is never good [...]” and additionally another one explained, “To settle something by force does not work and does not provide a solution.” Another participant explains, “Following Machiavelli the ends should justify the means [...] however the changes of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh are good and I do not agree on a solution by warfare.” It is remarkable that all participants prefer a peaceful *solution* to the conflict over a

solution by force, while at the same time being sceptical about the possibility of success of peaceful solutions<sup>115</sup>.

Several participant emphasises a solution depends on the interests of the states involved, and therefore the Co-Chairs of the Minsk-Group and the direct involved actors must have the interest to resolve the conflict in order to make a success of the peace process. Another participant says a solution to this conflict is hard, because “two parties are having a war and ten other countries are deciding upon it [...]” One explains that there should be a political, economic, educational and military plan in order to understand what happens after Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence. With such a plan, the states involved will encourage the conflict resolution more. Additionally, another participant explains, “No real attempt is made to resolve the conflict.” According to some participants there should be found a diplomatic solution to the conflict and a participant says a military agreement should prevent the directly involved actors from future attacks and the actors should be “focused on the future and at the same time be self-critical”. One participant, who has friends from both Armenia and Azerbaijan describes, “I respect people from both sides who really try to achieve mutual rapprochement.” One participant believes an Azerbaijani treat of using force and perhaps even a small use of force enlarge the awareness of the international community to involve in the resolution process. Furthermore this participant argues, “Azerbaijan needs to show its inhabitants its willingness to try to reclaim Nagorno-Karabakh [...] before it can agree on the independence of that region.”

### 3.3.2 *Résumé*

This résumé describes the ideas of conflict resolution of Armenians for settling the territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, because the interviews clarify how and why ideas among Armenians arise and develop<sup>116</sup>. The results could indicate cohesion between the ideas of the questioned Armenians and the analysed documents of Track One Diplomacy, because thoughts about collaboration and peacefulness in conflict resolution match.

Corresponding with the ideas proposed by the UN and OSCE, the majority of the participants believe a solution should be found by Azerbaijan and Armenia in cooperation with an international organisation. Most of the interviewed Armenians believe the OSCE should stimulate negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan in order to resolve the conflict. More specifically the Minsk-Group, with France, Russia and the US as Presidents, is an effective mediator, even though because of the benefits of the individual Presidents they are balancing interests. These Armenians believe the UN should only assist in implementing the final resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Most Armenians consider Nagorno-Karabakh as an important authority that should be involved in finding a solution and therefore they believe a solution should depend on the opinion of the inhabitants of the region of Nagorno-Karabakh itself. Some of the participants think Nagorno-Karabakh should be an official actor in the negotiations, and some believe Armenia is able to represent Nagorno-Karabakh.

As the Armenians, questioned in the quantitative structured interviews, the participants of the in-depth interviews prefer a peaceful solution to the conflict to a solution by force.

---

<sup>115</sup> The preference could be declared by socially desirable reactions.

<sup>116</sup> Together with the 3.2.2 *Résumé*, this subheading answers the research sub-question: What are the ideas of Armenians for settling the territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh?

Nevertheless the opinions differ about the way this should be applied. A peaceful solution should take into account the right to self-determination of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh, as it is a right within the international legal field. The inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh desire to be independent and therefore most of these Armenians believe independence of Nagorno-Karabakh is the best final settlement and hence a solution to the conflict in this region. A few participants believe that Nagorno-Karabakh should become a part of Armenia, but the majority believes it should become or stay independent. The interviewed Armenians all believe it takes time to solve the conflict by peaceful negotiations. Although some Armenians think time cannot heal the conflict, others believe time can heal the wounds of the conflict although it could take many years.

All the interviewed Armenians prefer a peaceful solution to a solution by force, because they believe it is impossible to solve the conflict by warfare and violence. Nonetheless scepticism exists and the majority thinks successful peaceful negotiations are hard to achieve. The ceasefire agreement is signed after constructive negotiations and does still exist, however all participants mention the ceasefire is often violated and therefore partially ineffective in ending the war. In order to create win-win situations and constructive peace talks, Azerbaijan and Armenia as well as the other states involved need to be willing to find a solution.

## Chapter 4: Conclusion

### 4.1 Conclusions

This conclusion describes and clarifies the cohesion between the ideas of conflict resolution of Armenians and the ideas of conflict resolution that have been proposed by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN) as part of Track One Diplomacy for settling the territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh<sup>117</sup>. Before the cohesion is explained the discrepancies and the similarities are described<sup>118</sup>.

According to Armenians, and the OSCE and UN as part of the international community, the involvement of the Minsk-Group should focus on stimulating the negotiations and peace process. Based on the results of the in-depth and structured interviews, it could be said that the questioned Armenians believe the Minsk-Group should and could play an essential role in resolving the conflict. The Minsk-Group is able to prevent the conflict for escalating, because of its composition of important international actors<sup>119</sup> and their interests in encouraging stability in the region. Academics<sup>120</sup> and ideas within Track One Diplomacy also referred to the Minsk-Group as important mediator in assisting in and speeding up the process of resolution. Moreover according to almost all formal ideas the UN should eventually assist in implementing the final resolution. Within Track One Diplomacy it is described that the UN should take the responsibility to ensure the safety and security of the population involved in the conflict. Yet, the questioned Armenians emphasise the UN should only assist in implementing the solution because it is impossible for the UN to resolve the conflict and control the violence in the region. This indicates cohesion between both proposals concerning the involvement of actors in conflict resolution.

Furthermore Armenians, the OSCE and UN share the idea that eventually Armenia and Azerbaijan should together find a solution in cooperation with the OSCE Track One Diplomacy. In official documents of the international community it is emphasised that Armenia and Azerbaijan must seek a final settlement during negotiations. Some interviewed Armenians believe the same, although they are more sceptical about the effectiveness of the peaceful negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Moreover, several Armenians argue that Nagorno-Karabakh should represent itself during the peaceful negotiations and be more involved in order to find a solution. Matter of course, the international community and its organisations are not able to share this idea without recognising the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh first. Therefore this discrepancy will remain inevitable; nonetheless in my opinion it makes sense that Armenians instinctively believe Nagorno-Karabakh should have a voice in resolving the conflict in their region.

Most of the interviewed Armenians believe Russia should be involved or even more involved in solving the conflict. Questioned Armenians in Armenia think Russia has a positive

---

<sup>117</sup> This description answers the research question: What is the cohesion between the ideas of conflict resolution of Armenians and the ideas of conflict resolution that have been proposed by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN) as part of Track One Diplomacy for settling the territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh?

<sup>118</sup> This description answers the following two research sub-questions: To what extent are the ideas of conflict resolution within Track One Diplomacy and of Armenians different for settling the territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh? And to what extent are the ideas of conflict resolution within Track One Diplomacy and of Armenians comparable for settling the territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh?

<sup>119</sup> As mentioned, the Co-chairs are France, Russia and the United States.

<sup>120</sup> Maresca, 1994; Zartman and Toufal, 1996.

influence in resolving the conflict by peaceful negotiations and Armenians in the Netherlands additionally believe Russia is able to mediate in a good way. Although knowledgeable academics<sup>121</sup> have insinuated the doubtful intentions of Russia, they also agree on the importance of Russia's peace-making efforts. Interestingly the importance of the role of Russia is not mentioned separately within the documents of Track One Diplomacy, but only as one of the Presidents of the Minsk-Group. I argue that the UN and the OSCE pursue to be unbiased in allocating roles and responsibilities, because by mentioning individual states the organisations could lose their neutrality in protecting international order. Additionally, proposals within Track One Diplomacy cannot position Russia more favourably, because of the twofold position of the Presidents of the Minsk-Group and Russia's permanent membership in the SC.

There is a discrepancy between the local and formal ideas about the final settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh. Views about the concrete settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh are not described in the analysed official documents. The neutrality and impartiality within Track One Diplomacy could declare the absence of the opinion of the OSCE and UN about a final settlement. On the other hand, the opinion of the interviewed Armenians is clearly expressed. A large majority of the semi-structured questioned Armenians favour the option of Nagorno-Karabakh as formal part of Armenia or favour the option of an independent country. Additionally according to a majority of the in-depth interviewed Armenians Nagorno-Karabakh should become or stay independent and some Armenians believe the best solution is Nagorno-Karabakh as formal part of Armenia. This could be explained by the principles and rules of law, which are of importance according to Armenians and the OSCE and UN. The official documents of the OSCE and UN emphasise the importance of principles and rules of international law, the UN Charter and the Basic Principles. Both organisations stress the importance respecting the principles of self-determination as well as territorial integrity. Remarkably, the majority of the interviewed Armenians seem to emphasise solely the principle of self-determination of Armenians in both Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.

Armenians mentioned the concrete influence of time on the conflict in the interviews as both negative and positive. A small majority of the surveyed Armenians believe the conflict will never be resolved and almost a fifth of these Armenians believe it will take two to ten years. Additionally despite the ceasefire, a few interviewed Armenians believe the longer the conflict will continue the more people will die or be hurt because of the instability and violations. The UN and OSCE do not mention concrete influence in their official documents, though emphasise the future will bring peace, stability and prosperity to Nagorno-Karabakh.

A solution by force is rejected in all the examined thoughts about conflict resolution. The UN and OSCE clearly explain that any treat or use of force is rejected and that the conflict must be resolved in a secure and peaceful way. Armenians, who were studied with both the structured and in-depth interviews, prefer a solution by peaceful negotiations to a solution by force. Although the ideas of Armenians and of the OSCE and UN acknowledge the difficulty of achieving a solution when many involved actors have different interests, the solution should be found by peaceful negotiations. The international community rejects uniformly a treat or use of force, but almost a fifth of the surveyed Armenians in Armenia believe it is likely a solution will be found by force. Some of the questioned Armenians in the Netherlands believe forcible

---

<sup>121</sup> Matveena, 2002; Croissant, 1998.

pressure could solve the conflict at least for a short-term. Although these Armenians prefer a peaceful solution, scepticism exists about the possibility of finding a solution by peaceful negotiations and a solution by force is therefore unfortunately more likely according to them. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the older an Armenian is, the greater the odds of supporting a peaceful solution. I believe this could be explained by the experience of war. The older generation of Armenians could have experienced violent clashes and warfare in Armenia. The ceasefire agreement, which is established after negotiations, stopped the violence and created better circumstances in the everyday lives of the inhabitants of the region. In my view, the younger generation only experienced a frozen conflict, in which negotiations did not yet break the deadlock situation nor find a resolution. In short, I argue that cohesion exists between the ideas of the way the conflict should ideally be resolved. Additionally, the older Armenians are, the stronger the cohesion becomes between the ideas of the OSCE and UN, and Armenians.

In short, in my view it could be argued that the ideas of involvement of different actors are comparable and that there is cohesion the ideas of conflict resolution of Armenians and the ideas of conflict resolution that have been proposed by the OSCE and UN. The OSCE and UN do not mention the actual implementation of solutions in every detail in order to provide room for Armenia and Azerbaijan to find a resolution together. The most important mutual idea is about the involvement of the Minsk-Group. According to all proposals, the conflict should be resolved by negotiations within Track One Diplomacy, and preferable mediated by the Minsk-Group of the OSCE. The ideas of a solution by peaceful negotiations are broadly shared, although some Armenians express doubts about the prospect of such a peaceful resolution.

In conclusion it could be argued that the ideas of the OSCE and UN for resolving the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh differ in a few ways with the views of Armenians, however the ideas of Armenians about a resolution for settling the territorial conflict are in more essential and basal ways comparable with the views that have been proposed within the Track One Diplomacy of the UN and OSCE. Therefore I argue that there is a strong cohesion between the ideas of conflict resolution, even though the thoughts do not correspond completely<sup>122</sup>.

## 4.2 Discussions

### *4.2.1 Reflection*

In this reflection the research process and the ethical considerations are reviewed. In general the research process went as priory planned, only two noteworthy incidences took place. The first occurrence is about the planning of the interviews. In the original planning a try-out interview was planned with a second generation Armenian in order to practice my interview skills and test the clearness, goodness and usefulness of the questions. Unfortunately the interview with the Armenian Ambassador unexpectedly took place earlier and therefore in this interview I was not able to implement the changes made after the try-out. The second incidence also concerns the planning of the in-depth interviews. It occurred that the original time-period for having the interviews appeared to be an inconvenient period, because of the Armenian Commemoration of 98th anniversary of Armenian Genocide. Potential participants and the AACA were busy organising or preparing the event. Therefore it was necessary to delay five interviews and even

---

<sup>122</sup> The conclusions described in this thesis should be interpreted with caution, since it cannot be guaranteed that the ideas analysed in this research can be representative for the ideas of the UN and OSCE, and Armenians.



cancel two interviews, which contributed to problems concerning achievability and time management.

The ethical considerations are minimalized because all aspects mentioned in subheading 2.3 were implemented or carried out. One participant refused to answer a question, but answered it after the interview. This question was about likelihood of finding a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by force. At first the participant wanted to merely focus on solutions by peaceful manners, but in the end the participant decided to mention “a solution by force is possible, [...] however not at all desirable and not presumable.” Additionally four participants wanted to stay anonymous and the others did not care or gave me the opportunity to decide. In order to draw one line it is decided to keep all the participants anonymous, except the Armenian Ambassador because she explicitly wanted me to use her professional position. Seven of the eleven participants provided feedback on the written out interviews. Both the original transcript and the suggestions were used and kept in mind during the analyses.

#### *4.2.2 Discussion and future research*

In this research different observations are made, which should be discussed. Firstly, both in the structured and in-depth interviews a question is asked about the likeliness of a solution by force. However, the meaning of using force is not specified in either of the methods. As the data of the structured interviews are secondarily analysed and hence not sampled for this research, no clarification could be made there. Therefore, it is decided not to specify force in the in-depth interviews either. Although it is a conscious choice to provide the participants room for their own interpretation, perhaps some argue that this concept should be defined in detail. Secondly, in the qualitative data there were many missing values with percentages above 10%, which are therefore not included in the content analyses. As a researcher I am aware of this shortage of the data and my explanation of its lack is the huge amount of respondents answering questions with the option ‘don’t know’. Future research could include the ‘don’t know’ option into the analyses.

Additionally, potential participants<sup>123</sup> of the in-depth interviews were asked whether or not to have knowledge about the conflict, because basic familiarity was required in order to be able to talk about ideas of resolutions. This research could furthermore have excluded potential participants, because they do not want to talk about the subject. Moreover there are perhaps individuals, who are affected by the conflict but do not have the awareness of the conflict.

Moreover there are three concepts, which emerged from the in-depth interviews but were not used in this research. The reason of this rejection is because these concepts did not contribute enough in answering the research questions. Five participants said that differences in religion play an important role in the continuation of the conflict. Furthermore seven participants mentioned the Armenian Genocide is an important historical cause, which encouraged tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia. A few participants mention cultural differences between Azeri’s and inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh as important insurmountable issues, which impede finding a solution.

This research merely focused on Armenian ideas of conflict resolution. Nine participants of the in-depth interviews justly asked why this research has a one-sided focus<sup>124</sup>. Future research should expand the knowledge of ideas by investigating Azerbaijani ideas as well as

---

<sup>123</sup> With potential participants it is meant Armenians, who belong to the research population.

<sup>124</sup> This reasoning is explained in the Introduction - Definition of research problem.

ideas of inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh on resolving the conflict. Because this research does not include in-depth interviews with Armenians living in Armenia, a future researcher should visit the region itself to interview inhabitants of the different actors involved<sup>125</sup>.

---

<sup>125</sup> Direct actors involved are, as defined in table 2, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh.

## Bibliography

- Arnstein, S.R. (1969). A Ladder Of Citizen Participation. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 35, (4), pp. 216 – 224.
- Barbolet, A., Bremner, D., Champain, P., Goldwyn, R., Killick, N., and Klein D. (2004). Oil and the Search for Peace in the South Caucasus: The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. *International Alert*.
- Böhmelt, T. (2010). The effectiveness of tracks of diplomacy strategies in third-party interventions. *Journal of Peace Research*, 47, (2), pp. 167-178.
- Bryman, A. (2008). *Social Research Methods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bryman, A. (2012). *Social Research Methods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Carment, D and Fischer, M. (2009). R2P and the Role of Regional Organisations in Ethnic Conflict Management, Prevention and Resolution: The Unfinished Agenda. *Global Responsibility to Protect I*, pp. 261-290.
- Charmaz, K. (2006). *Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide through Qualitative Analysis*. London: Sage Publications Ltd.
- Chigas, D. (1997). Unofficial Interventions with Official Actors: Parallel Negotiation Training in Violent Intrastate Conflicts. *International Negotiation* 2, (3), pp. 409-436.
- Chorbajian, L. (2001). *The Making of Nagorno-Karabakh. Introduction*. London: Palgrave.
- Cornell, S. Report on The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. Uppsala University: Department of East European Studies, 1999.
- Cobb, S. (2003). Fostering Coexistence in Identity-based conflicts: Toward a Narrative Approach. In Chayes, A. and Minow, M. (Eds.). *Imagine Coexistence* (pp. 294-310). San Francisco: Jossey Bass.
- Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. (1994). REPORT on the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh (Doc. 7182). Strasbourg: Author. Via: <http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/workingdocs/doc94/edoc7182.htm>
- Cornell, S. Report on The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. Uppsala University: Department of East European Studies, 1999.
- Croissant, M.P. (1998). *The Armenia – Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications*. Westport: Praeger.
- CSCE. Helsinki Final Act. Helsinki: OSCE, 1975. Retrieved from: <http://www.osce.org/mc/39501?download=true>.
- Dehdashti, R. (1997). Nagorno-Karabakh: A case-study of OSCE conflict settlement. In M.Bothe, N. Ronzitti, & A. Rosas (Eds.), *The OSCE in the maintenance of peace and security: Conflict prevention, crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes* (pp. 459-479). The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
- Dehdashti-Rasmussen, R. (2006). *The Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh: Causes, the Status of Negotiations, and Prospects*. Hamburg: Centre for OSCE Research, pp. 189-210.
- De Waal, T. (2003). *Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through peace and war*. New York: University Press.
- De Waal, T. (2008, December). The Karabakh Trap: Dangers and dilemmas of the Nagorny Karabkah Conflict. London: Conciliation Resources. Retrieved from: <http://www.c-r.org/resources/karabakh-trap-dangers-and-dilemmas-nagorny-karabakh-conflict>.

- De Waal, T. (2010). *The Caucasus: An introduction*. Oxford: University Press.
- Diamond, L. and McDonald, J. (1991). *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Guide and Analysis* Occasional Paper No. 3. Iowa: Iowa Peace Institute.
- Druckman, D., & Mooradian, M. (1999). Hurting Stalemate of Mediation? The Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. *Journal of Peace Research*, 36 (6), pp. 709-727.
- Dixon, M. (2007). *Textbook on International Law*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Emerson, R. (1971). Self-determination. *The American Journal of International Law*, 65 (3), pp. 459-475.
- Faber, M. & Kasprzyk, A. (2003). How should OSCE deal with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict? *Helsinki Monitor*, 14, (1), pp. 1-6.
- Field, A. (2009). *Discovering Statistics Using SPSS: and sex and drugs and rock 'n' roll*. London: Sage Publications Ltd.
- Freizer, S. (2011, Jun 24). A moment for peace in the South Caucasus. *International Herald Tribune*, pp. 8. Via: <http://search.proquest.com/docview/>.
- Gahramanova, A. (2010). Paradigms of Political Mythologies and Perspectives of Reconciliation in the Case of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. *International Negotiation*, 15, (1), pp. 133-152.
- Gamaghelyan, P. (2010). Rethinking the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: Identity, politics, scholarship. *International Negotiation*, 15 (1), 33 -56.
- Ghaplanyan, I. (2010). Empowering and Engaging Civil Society in Conflict Resolution: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh. *International Negotiation*, 15, (1), pp. 81-106.
- Goldstein, J.S. & Pevehouse, J.C. (2009). *Principles of international relations*. New York: Pearson Longman.
- Gürkaynak, C.E.C. (2007). Track Two Diplomacy from a Track One Perspective: Comparing the Perceptions of Turkish and American Diplomats. *International Negotiations*, 12, 1, pp. 57-82.
- Hille, C. (2010a). *State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus*. Leiden/Boston: Brill.
- Hille, C. (2010b). *Internationaal Publiekrecht vanuit Politicologisch Perspectief*. Dordrecht: Republic of Letters.
- Human Rights Watch. 'Azerbaijan. Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh', New York: Human Rights Watch, Helsinki, 1994, via: <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/AZER%20Conflict%20in%20N-K%20Dec94.pdf>.
- Hunter, S.T. (2006). Borders, Conflict, and Security in the Caucasus: The legacy of the Past. *SAIS Review of International Affairs*, 26, (1), pp. 111-125.
- Lobjakas, A. (2009, April). NATO Lacks the Stomach for South Caucasus Fight. *NATO and The South Caucasus*, 5, Center for Security Studies, Retrieved from: <http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CAD>.
- Magalhaes, de. J.C. (1988). *The pure concept of diplomacy*. New York/London: Greenwood Press. Originally published in 1915.
- Malone, D.M. (2008). Security Council. In Weiss, T.G. and Daws, S. (Eds.). *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations* (pp.117 -136). London: Oxford University Press.

- Mapendere, J. (2001). Defining Track One and a Half Diplomacy, its complementarity and the analysis of factors that facilitate its success. *Culture of Peace Online Journal*, 2, (1), pp. 66-81.
- Maresca, J. J. (2000). The international community and the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. In B. W. Jentleson (Ed.), *Opportunities missed, opportunities seized: preventive diplomacy in the post-cold war world* (pp. 68-91). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Matveeva, A. (2002). Nagorno Karabakh: A Straightforward Territorial Conflict: Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia, via: <http://www.conflict-prevention.net/page.php?id=40&formid=73&action=show&surveyid=41>.
- Mirzoyan, K. (2012). Official website of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Documents of the Cease-fire Agreement and the Bishkek Protocol.
- Nan, S.A. (2003). Track I Diplomacy. *Beyond Intractability*. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado: Boulder. Retrieved via: <http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/track1-diplomacy>.
- Nordstrom, C. (2004). *Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International Profiteering in the Twenty- First Century*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Peterson, M.J. (2008). General Assembly. In Weiss, T.G. and Daws, S. (Eds.). *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations* (pp. 97 – 117). London: Oxford University Press.
- Ramsbotham, O. And Woodhouse, T. (2005). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution. The Prevention, Management And Transformation Of Deadly Conflicts*. New York: John Wiley and Sons Ltd.
- Repko, A.F. (2008). *Interdisciplinary Research. Process And Theory*. London: Sage Publications Ltd.
- Rittberger, V. and Zangl, B. (2006). *International Organisations. Policy, Politics and Policies*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ronzitti, N. (1997). OSCE peace-keeping. In M. Bothe, N. Ronzitti, & Allan Rosas (Eds.). *The OSCE in the maintenance of peace and security: conflict prevention, crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes* (pp. 237-255). The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
- Said, A.A. and Lerche, C.O. (1995). *Concepts of International Politics in Global Perspective*. Englewood Cliffs: Simon & Schuster.
- Saunders, H.H. (1991). Officials and citizens in international relations. In Volkan, V. Montville, M. & Julius, D. (Eds.), *The Pschodynamics of International Relations: Vol. 2. Unofficial diplomacy at work* (pp.41-69). Massachusetts: Lexington Books.
- Shirinov, R. (2011, July 1). Gandhian way for Nagorno-Karabakh: Is that feasible? *Journal of Conflict Transformation*, Caucasus Edition. Retrieved from: <http://caucasusedition.net/analysis/gandhian-way-for-nagorno-karabakh-is-that-feasible/>.
- Stein, W. K. and Lewis, W. S. (1996). Mediation in the Middle East. In Crocker, C., Harnpson, F. and Aall, P. (Eds), *Manage global chaos: Sources of and Responses to international conflict* (pp. 475-486). Washington: United States Institute of Peace.
- Storey, D. (2001). *Territory: The claiming of space*. Harlow: Prentice Hall.
- Supreme Court of Canada. (1998). Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. Retrieved from: <http://scc.lexum.org/decisia-scc-csc/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1643/index.do>.
- United Nations. (2006, december). *The Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice*. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information.

- Weiss, T.G. and Daws, S. (Eds.) (2008). *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Zacher, M.W. (2001). The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force. *International Organization*, 55 (2), pp. 215-250.
- Zartman, I.W. and Touval, S. (1996). International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era. In . eds. Crocker, C. Hampson, F. and Aall, P. (Eds), *Managing Global Chaos* (pp 445-461), Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

#### Digital sources and news agencies

- AAA (2013). Nagorno Karabakh Conflict Resolution. *Website of the Azerbaijan America Alliance*. Washington: Author. Retrieved from: <http://azerbaijanamericaalliance.org/Nagorno-karabakh-resolution>.
- Advisory Council on International Affairs. (2005). *De nieuwe oostelijke buurlanden van de Europese Unie: Landenoverzichten* (No. 44). Den Haag: Author. Via: [http://cms.webbeat.nl/ContentSuite/upload/aiv/doc/44AIV\(2\)\(1\).pdf](http://cms.webbeat.nl/ContentSuite/upload/aiv/doc/44AIV(2)(1).pdf)
- BBC News. (2012). Regions and territories: Nagorno-Karabakh via: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country\\_profiles/3658938.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/3658938.stm) (accessed: 30-10-2012).
- Danielyan, E. (2005, December 13). OSCE exploring Karabakh peacekeeping mission. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Retrieved from <http://www.azatutyun.org/content/article/1579830.html>
- ICJ (International Court of Justice). (2013). Official Website ICJ: The Court. Retrieved from: <http://www.icj-cij.org/homepage/index.php>.
- News.Az. (2013a). Karabakh News. All news from Azerbaijan in Armenian. Retrieved from: <http://www.news.az/articles/karabakh>.
- News.Az. (2013b, March). Azerbaijani FM believes in OSCE MG co-chairs role in Karabakh settlement. Retrieved from: <http://www.news.az/articles/karabakh/77980>.
- NKR MFA Press Service (2012, September 12). Monitoring. *ArtSakhtert*. Retrieved from <http://artsakhtert.com>
- NKRUSA (Office of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic USA). (2013) *Country overview*. Washington: Author. Retrieved from: [http://www.nkrusa.org/country\\_profile/overview.shtml](http://www.nkrusa.org/country_profile/overview.shtml).
- OSCE (2013). Website of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Retrieved from: <http://www.osce.org/>.
- RFE/RL (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty). (2013). News and Features from the Caucasus. *Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty*. Retrieved from: <http://www.rferl.org/section/caucasus/174.html>
- RIA Novosti. (2012, January). No Breakthrough in Karabakh Summit Talks. *The Russian News & Information Agency RIA Novosti*. Retrieved from: <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20120123/170906724.html>.
- Sahakyan, B.S. (2013). Official website of the President of the Nagorno Karabagh Republic. NKR: The History of Formation. Via: <http://www.president.nkr.am/en/nkr/>.

- Soberberg, N.E. (2012, September 11). A Leadership Opportunity. *Huffington Post*. Retrieved from [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amb-nancy-e-soderberg/a-leadership-opportunity\\_b\\_2040975.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amb-nancy-e-soderberg/a-leadership-opportunity_b_2040975.html).
- Taylor-Line, A. (2011, December 10). The National Womb. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/opinion/sunday/the-national-womb.html>.
- UAAS (2013). Background, Facts and Chronology. *Website of the Union of Armenian Associations in Sweden*. Sweden: Union of Armenian Associations in Sweden. Retrieved from: <http://www.mountainous-karabakh.org/index.html>.
- UN (2013). Website of the United Nations (UN). Retrieved from: [www.un.org](http://www.un.org).

## Appendixes

### 1. Question content Caucasus Barometer 2011

Source: Caucasus Research Resource Centers. (2011). "Caucasus Barometer". [dataset]  
Retrieved from <http://www.crrccenters.org/caucasusbarometer/>.

#### Questions on Nagorno-Karabakh

**Question 1.** In your opinion, should the following countries or organizations be more involved; less involved; or not involved at all in finding a solution for the Nagorno Karabakh conflict?

		More involved	Less involved	Not involved at all	(Don't know)	(Refuse to answer)
1	Russia	3	2	1	-1	-2
2	United States	3	2	1	-1	-2
3	France	3	2	1	-1	-2
4	Turkey	3	2	1	-1	-2
5	European Union	3	2	1	-1	-2

**Question 2.** When do you think the Nagorno Karabakh conflict will be resolved?

- 1 It has already been resolved
- 2 Within the next year
- 3 In 2–5 years
- 5 In 6–10 years
- 6 In more than 10 years
- 7 Never
- 1 (Don't know)
- 2(Refuse to answer)

**Question 3.** In your opinion, have the prospects of Nagorno Karabakh becoming an integral part of Armenia increased, stayed the same, or decreased since the ceasefire agreement in May 1994?

- 3 Increased
- 2 Stayed the same
- 1 Decreased
- 1 (Don't know)
- 2(Refuse to answer)

**Question 4.** In your opinion, how likely is it to find a solution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict within the next 5 years by ... ?

		Very unlikely	Rather unlikely	Rather likely	Very likely	(Don't know)	(Refuse to answer)
1	[by] peaceful negotiation?	1	2	3	4	-1	-2
2	[by] force?	1	2	3	4	-1	-2



**Question 5.** Various ideas have been proposed for settling the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. As I mention each idea, please tell me whether you would definitely favor it; might accept it under certain circumstances; or would never accept it. (ONE ANSWER IN EACH ROW)

1	Have Nagorno-Karabakh as a formal part of Armenia.	3	2	1	-1	-2
2	Have Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent country.	3	2	1	-1	-2
3	Create a special administrative region that will be jointly governed by Azerbaijan and Armenia.	3	2	1	-1	-2
4	Have Nagorno-Karabakh with a high degree of autonomy within Azerbaijan.	3	2	1	-1	-2
5	Have Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan without autonomy.	3	2	1	-1	-2

3 = Definitely favor

2 = Accept under certain circumstances

1= Never accept

-1 = (Don't know)

-2 = (Refuse to answer)

## 2. Official documents

The following official documents are sampled and analysed in this research:

- OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs. (1996, December 2). Lisbon Summit (DOC.S/1/96). Annex 1: Statement of the OSCE Chairman in-office. Lisbon: Author. Retrieved from: <http://www.osce.org/mc/58691>
- OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs. (1999). Istanbul Summit Declaration. Annex 2: Summit declaration 20/21. Istanbul: Author Retrieved from: <http://www.osce.org/mc/39569?download=true>.
- OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs. (2007). Issue Statement on Nagorno-Karabakh. Madrid: Author.
- OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs. (2009, July 10). L'Aquila Summit of the Eight Declaration. Joint Statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.
- OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs. (2010a, June 26). Muskoko Declaration. Joint Statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.
- OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs. (2010b, December 1). Astana Declaration. Joint Statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.
- OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs. (2011a, May 26). Deauville Declaration. Joint Statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.
- OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs. (2011b, May 26). Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents. Joint Statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. Retrieved via: <http://search.proquest.com/docview/870704323?accountid=36823>
- OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairs. (2012). Joint Statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. Yerevan: Author.
- OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs. Report: Field Assessment Mission to the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan Surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, 2012. Retrieved from: <http://www.osce.org/mg>.
- PACE. (2005). Resolution 1416: The conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference. Retrieved from: [http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta05/ERES1416.htm#\\_ftn1](http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta05/ERES1416.htm#_ftn1)
- Presidents of the OSCE Minsk Group. (2012). Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents. (*Superintendent of Documents, 91393*). Los Cabos, Mexico: Press Release OSCE Minsk Group, pp. 1-3. Retrieved from: <http://www.osce.org/mg/91393>
- UN General Assembly. (2006). Resolution 60/285 (2006) The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, on 15 September 2006, A/RES/60/285 (2006). Retrieved from: [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/60/285](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/60/285).
- UN General Assembly. (2008). Resolution 62/243 (2008) The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, on 14 March 2008, A/RES/62/243 (2008). Retrieved from: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/ga10693.doc.htm>.
- UN Security Council. (1993a). *Resolution 822 (1993) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3205th meeting, on 30 April 1993, S/RES/822 (1993)*. Retrieved from: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f15764.html>.

- UN Security Council. (1993b). *Resolution 853 (1993) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3259th meeting, on 29 July 1993*, S/RES/853 (1993). Retrieved from: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f15a60.html>.
- UN Security Council. (1993c). *Resolution 874 (1993) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3292nd meeting, on 14 October 1993*, S/RES/874 (1993). Retrieved from: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f1684.html>.
- UN Security Council. (1993d). *Resolution 884 (1993) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3313th meeting, on 12 November 1993*, S/RES/884 (1993). Retrieved from: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f16520.html>.

### 3. Question content Armenian Ambassador

#### Interview Ambassador

This interview will be used in order to illustrate the ideas of conflict resolution of the OSCE and the UN of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (investigated by analysing resolutions, proposals and summits). Because the focus of my research lies on the Armenian side, it is interesting to talk with you, as an official envoy of Armenia.

- *What should, in your opinion, be the role of the United Nations in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict? Are the ideas of the United Nations for settling the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh a contribution to the process of conflict resolution?*
- *What should, in your opinion, be the role of the OSCE in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict? What is your opinion about the OSCE as mediator? What should be/is the contribution of the OSCE?*
- *When do you think the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will be resolved?*
- *What is the influence of time on the conflict?*
- *What is the role of Azerbaijan in finding a solution to the conflict? What should be the role of Azerbaijan in finding a solution to the conflict?*
- *What is the role of Armenia in finding a solution to the conflict? What should be the role of Armenia in finding a solution to the conflict?*
- *What are the prospects of Nagorno Karabakh becoming an integral part of Armenia since the ceasefire agreement in May 1994?*
- *In your opinion, how likely is it to find a solution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict by force?*
- *In your opinion, how likely is it to find a solution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict by peaceful negotiations?*
- *Would you like to add something to this interview?*

Extra question:

- *What sources or principles of law need to be taken into account when proposing ideas of for settling the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh? (For example Self-determination, territorial integrity, UN Charter, Basic Principles)*

#### 4. Question content Armenians

##### **Interview Armenians in the Netherlands**

This interview will be used to find out the ideas of conflict resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh. The focus of my thesis is on the ideas of solutions of Armenians in both Armenia and Netherlands.

- Duration interview
- Focus questions
- Recording of interview?
- Quoting in thesis ok?
- Sending report afterwards?
- Anonymously in thesis?
- I have some questions, however if you have something to add in between please do so.

- *Personal situation*

- Sensitivity topic: participation voluntarily, possibility to refuse to give answer to a certain question.

- *Can you summarize in three sentences (very briefly) what the conflict is about?*
- *Is there a conflict that should be resolved? Why / why not?*
- *When do you think the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will be resolved?*
- *Does time affect the conflict? What is the influence of time on the conflict?*
- *Which parties or actors play a role in resolving the conflict? What kind of role?*
- *What is the role of Armenia in finding a solution to the conflict? What should be the role of Armenia in finding a solution to the conflict?*
- *What is the role of Azerbaijan in finding a solution to the conflict? What should be the role of Azerbaijan in finding a solution to the conflict?*
- *What do you think is a solution to the conflict?*
- *In your opinion, how likely is it to find a solution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict by force?*
- *In your opinion, how likely is it to find a solution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict by peaceful negotiations?*
- *Are there any other solutions besides solutions by force and by peaceful negotiations?*

- *In May 1994, a ceasefire agreement was signed by Armenia and Azerbaijan in cooperation with the OSCE Minsk Group, in which Russia played an important role. Did the ceasefire agreement affect the conflict? What has been the influence of the ceasefire agreement? Does everyone follow the rules of the ceasefire?*
- *If you could give an advice about resolving the conflict to the Armenian negotiator / representative what would you recommend?*
- *Would you like to add something to this interview?*